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Abstract 
	  
	  
	  
Hazard  and impact  analysis  is an indispensable task  during the specification and  develop- 
ment  of safety-critical  technical  systems, and  particularly of their software-intensive control 
parts.   There  is a lack of methods supporting an  effective  (reusable, automated) and  inte- 
grated (cross-disciplinary) way to carry out such  analyses. 
	  
This report  was  motivated  by an  industrial  project  whose goal was  to survey  and  propose 
methods and  models  for documentation and  analysis of a  system and  its environment to 
support  hazard and  impact analysis as  an important  task  of safety  engineering and  system 
development. We present and investigate three perspectives of how to properly 
	  
encode safety-relevant domain  knowledge for better  reuse and automation, 
identify and assess all relevant  hazards, as well as 
pre-process this information and make  it easily accessible for reuse in other safety  and 
systems engineering activities and, moreover, in similar engineering projects. 
	  
The first perspective focuses on the transition  from informal to a formal, model-based repre- 
sentation of knowledge about  hazards and system requirements. 
	  
The  second perspective provides  a methodology to identify and  treat  hazards based on a 
state-machine model of the considered system. 
	  
The  third perspective shows a  tool-supported procedure for modeling  faulty  behaviors of 
both, physical  and software  components in a qualitative way and for automatically determin- 
ing their impact  based on the structural  description of the physical  and  computational/soft- 
ware parts  of the system and a model of the environment. 
	  
All perspectives are shown  in their characteristics and capabilities by means of a case study 
on a drive train in the commercial road vehicle  domain. 
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1  Motivation and Overview 
	  
	  
	  
This section gives  an overview of current  challenges of the safety  domain  and  a previously 
performed collaboration with industry coining the central  motivation for this report. 
	  
	  
	  
1.1  Challenges in System Safety Analysis 
	  
	  
Cyber-physical systems are  widespread in safety-critical  domains such  as,  e. g.,  vehicles, 
production  machinery, aircraft  or medical  devices.  Failures  of these systems may  lead  to 
considerable loss of money or even  endanger human  lives. This emphasizes the importance 
of correct  behavior  of these systems, which can  be improved  through  analysis techniques, 
mostly  in terms  of formal  verification  [Cam10].   Formal  analysis is facilitated  by a  formal 
model.   A suitable  modeling  theory  for these systems helps  in their development, mainte- 
nance, simulation,  and verification. 
	  
At a high level, the model  of a cyber-physical system may not explicitly distinguish  whether 
its subsystems or components are  software  or physical  components, and  they may be rep- 
resented in a uniform way,  e. g., as  black  boxes with a mapping  from inputs  to outputs  or 
as transition  systems. Often, these models  try to capture the intended function of a system, 
rather than its entire possible behavior. For instance, in early phases of design, it may not yet 
have been decided whether  a certain sub-system will be realized  by software, a physical sys- 
tem, or a combination of both. Software components operate in discrete program  steps, while 
the physical  components evolve over time intervals  following physical  constraints. From our 
experience in a number of industrial collaborations [SC12], we know that system descriptions 
should  not get too complicated and  hardly readable. Hence, when modeling  cyber-physical 
systems, one  challenge is to find a proper  abstraction of physical  and  computational phe- 
nomena. 
	  
However,  when  the  behavior  has  to be  analyzed in detail,  the  different  nature  of software 
and  physical  components will often  require  models  that  appropriately capture the  physical 
phenomena that determine system behavior. This is even mandatory when the consideration 
of faulty behavior  is involved, as e. g., in diagnosis, testing,  or safety  analysis: The variety of 
faults in software  components can  mostly be reduced to erroneous (manual or automated) 
transformations on the  path  from requirements to the  executables (including inappropriate 
requirements). Beyond  that,  faults of physical  components are  much  more  subject to quite 
complex physical phenomena, such as e.g., wearout  or unforeseen types of stress. However, 
this still makes it possible to enumerate and  model  at least  the respective fault classes.  As 
opposed to software  components, most physical  systems, such  as components in electrical, 
mechanical, hydraulic,  and  pneumatic circuits,  cannot  be appropriately modeled by simple 
input-output  behaviors. Even if they have  an intended preferred cause-effect direction under 
nominal system behavior, this may be perturbed under  the presence of a fault. 
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Having  such  characteristics in mind,  a safety  engineer has  to gain  understanding of haz- 
ards  and  perform  safety-oriented validation  of the specification.  This includes  understand- 
ing the relationship between software, electronic  hardware and physical  components’ faults, 
and  their consequences in terms  of hazardous system failures and,  finally, their impacts  on 
the system environment. But the relationship between system safety  goals  and  component 
safety  and  reliability requirements is often  not formally captured.  This makes it difficult to 
relate software, electronic  or physical component misbehavior to hazards at the system level 
[Lev12]. 
	  
Another issue  is that technical  systems are mainly modeled as glass-boxes to tie defects and 
their propagation to their component structure and  to support  detailed  design  for reliability. 
In other words, single phases of system operation (i. e., single transitions, linear event causal 
chain) are regarded. This is important but not enough as it detracts from the investigation of 
system behavior  before and after critical events and the consideration of temporally distant or 
even  external  causal factors aside from system deficiencies. In other words, multiple phases 
of system operation (i. e., multiple transitions, non-linear  causal chain) are regarded. 
	  
Hazard  knowledge has  hardly ever been systematically transferred to interdisciplinary,  qual- 
itative behavioral system models  describing interaction  between the system and its environ- 
ment.  At our chair, we work on approaches [Bro12, SF11] based on system models  that are 
suitable  to be reused and checked for correctness, completeness and consistency w.r.t. the 
tasks  of safety  engineering. Section  1.2 provides  a short  overview of related  work that also 
aims to meet  these challenges. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
1.2  Overview of State-of-the-Art Safety Analysis 
	  
	  
Figure 1.1 depicts approaches to hazard  analysis  according to their direction towards  effects 
or causal factors of hazards. A more detailed  version of the following overview with complete 
citations,  references and remarks has  been published in [Gle13]. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
Fault Hazard Impact 
	  
	  
	  
Hazard, Fault or  Reliability Analysis Impact, Risk or  Accident Analysis 
	  
FTA, RCA, ARP SSA 
PRA, FMEA, ETA, LOPA 
	  
	  
	  
FMECA 
HAZOP/PAAG, ARP FHA, HAZID 
STAMP 
ECF, AcciMap, CRIOP, ICPS 
	  
	  
Figure 1.1: Approaches to hazard analysis for system safety  assessment 
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Defect  Classification and Representation   Because of the variety in their perception, de- 
fects are categorized and modeled along technology and task specific, non-standard criteria, 
e.g., to compare system testing  approaches, for fault-tolerance or reliability analysis, for mu- 
tation or fault-injection techniques [SF11]. 
	  
	  
	  
Top-Down  from Hazard to Fault    This direction  can  be carried  out using  deductive tech- 
niques  like, e.g.,  static  or dynamic  fault tree  (FTA) [DBB92] or root cause (RCA) analysis. 
Some  of the defect models  are based on the data-flow architecture of a system, others  apply 
state machine models  extended with fault variables and ports for each system component. 
	  
	  
	  
Bottom-Up from Fault to Hazard    This direction  can  be addressed by inductive methods 
like, e.g.,  failure mode,  effect (and  criticality) analysis (FME(C)A), event  tree  analysis (ETA) 
or, similarly, layer of protection  analysis (LOPA). Hazard  and operability analysis (HAZOP or 
PAAG) takes particular account of controllability by humans. There are elaborate approaches 
like probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) or informal, early-stage methods like hazard identi- 
fication (HAZID) or preliminary hazard lists. 
	  
Model-based systems technology from Artificial Intelligence  has  been applied  to automate 
the generation of effects  (i. e., hazards) for FMEA from a model  of the (faulty) system. The 
AutoSteve system [Pri00] was specialized on performing FMEA of electrical  car subsystems 
and has  been transferred into a commercial product  (Capital SimCertify, [Gra]). The AUTAS 
project developed a generic FMEA tool with applications to electrical,  hydraulic,  pneumatic, 
and  mechanical systems in aeronautic systems [PCB+ 04]  and  has  also  been applied  to 
automotive subsystems [SF12a]. 
	  
	  
	  
Between Hazard and Impact    To understand hazards and  their risks in terms  of impacts, 
methods like, e.g.,  events and  causal factors  (ECF)  [BC95]  or AcciMap  [SR02]  consider 
causal factors  of all, environment, user  and  system.  This includes  system operations or 
use  cases (e.g., driving missions and situations), operational incidents  or damage scenarios 
(e.g.,  car accidents) as  well as  the physical  system interface. Crisis intervention  in offshore 
production  (CRIOP) [JBS+ 11] assesses the interface  between human  operators and techni- 
cal systems within offshore  control rooms  to uncover  obstacles for accident response.  The 
system-theoretic accident model and processes (STAMP) [Lev12] perceives safety as a con- 
trol problem  in a socio-technical system, i.e., a collaboration of humans and  technical  sys- 
tems.  STAMP classifies human  errors,  identifies inadequate control beyond  system failures 
and derives  required  constraints. 
	  
	  
	  
Safety Engineering Guidance and Standards   Hazard  analysis is a vital early step recom- 
mended by general or domain-specific safety  standards, e.g., IEC 65108  for general mecha- 
tronics, ISO 26262  for automotive control, EN 50128  for train control or DoD MIL-STD-882D 
for technical  systems. They consider the whole safety  process including quantitative risk as- 
sessment for the regarded kinds of systems to avoid unwanted relationships between system 
safety goals and subsystem or component requirements. IEC 65108 concerns of preliminary 
hazard and  risk analysis (PHA). The SAE aircraft recommended practices (ARP) 4754  and 
8 
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4761  advise the  steps of functional  hazard assessment (FHA) based on a function list re- 
garding  failures and  crew actions, followed by preliminary and  final system safety/reliability 
assessment (SSA), which among  FTA requires a mixture of techniques. 
	  
	  
	  
1.3  Project Goals 
	  
	  
This report  was  inspired  by the  project  Efficient  Hazard  and  Impact  Analysis for Automo- 
tive Mechatronics Systems supported by our industrial partners from ITK Engineering AG1, 
Stuttgart-Vaihingen. The core activities of this project were carried through between May and 
December 2012.  The goal of the project  was  to survey  and  propose methods and  models 
for concise and  reusable documentation of a system and  its operational context  (environ- 
ment)  in order  to support  system development, in particular,  hazard and  impact  analysis— 
comparable to hazard analysis and  risk assessment (HARA) in ISO 26262  part  3—as  an 
important  task  of safety  engineering.  The  proposed models  and  methods should  capture 
enough details  to fit their purpose and  be  restricted and  structured in order  to support  ef- 
ficient reuse and  automation.  In order  to aim at the  development of an  appropriate safety 
analysis methodology, any proposed approach should  comply as much as possible with the 
following criteria: 
	  
Comprehensibility of models  by educated control, safety  and reliability engineers, 
Reasonable effort for model creation, use  and reuse (maintenance or transformation), 
Manageable complexity by modular  model decomposition, 
Ratability of relative completeness of specific analysis steps, 
Ratability of coverage for the verification of safety  functions, 
Smooth  transition  into engineering practice  by a multi-step  and multi-view methodology. 
	  
Primary  input to the  project  was  an  FMEA documentation (denoted as  provided  data,  see 
Section  3) representing preliminary results of the hazard and impact analysis of a commercial 
road vehicle drive train (Sections 2 and 4.3). In addition to this input, the work at hand  could 
gain from experiences and knowledge from other projects  as well as efforts at the chair in the 
automotive and embedded software  domain.  In the mentioned case study,  we explore  three 
approaches  introduced in Section  1.4,  each taking  a  different  perspective and  focussing 
different sub-tasks of model-based hazard and impact analysis. 
	  
	  
	  
1.4  Overview of the Report 
	  
	  
In this report,  we focus on software  and systems engineering aspects as well as on qualita- 
tive physical  modeling  and  fault propagation. Following the project  goals  described before, 
we discuss three  perspectives (Figure 1.2) in model-based, reusable safety (i. e., hazard and 
impact) analysis: 
	  
1 www.itk-engineering.de 
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Figure 1.2: Overview and relationships between the three  perspectives 
	  
	  
	  
The first  perspective   regards the  formalization  of behavioral  system properties  initially 
given in an informal manner. These properties can be positive or wanted  (i. e., requirements) 
as well as negative or unwanted (i. e., hazards)—both are dual in many cases. This method 
is abstract  in the  sense that  it does not care  about  the  kind of properties—properties of 
computational or physical  processes. The main ideas were  presented in [SHT12].  Here,  a 
new aspect of this representation is introduced: how to use  it for the specification of hazards. 
Further  details  are described in Chapter 3. 
	  
	  
	  
The second perspective   regards safety analysis  from a functional view  of both, the sys- 
tem and  its environment. Hence, it focuses on system functionality, interface  behavior  and 
interaction  between system and environment using state machine modeling.  This method  is 
less  abstract  than the previous  one but neither splits system properties into virtual and phys- 
ical ones, the  model  implicitly contains information  about  potential  behavioral differences. 
For this, it deals with state machine models  representing faulty behavior. The state machine 
model  is the result  of manual analysis and  specific  to the functionality of the system under 
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consideration. Further  details  are described in Chapter 4. 
	  
	  
	  
The third perspective   approaches hazard analysis by automatically deducing the  pres- 
ence or absence of hazards based on behavior  models  of system components and the com- 
ponent  structure. Also the impact of hazards on the environment is generated automatically 
based on an abstract model  of the environment. The approach builds on previous  work on 
automated FMEA of physical  systems [Str08], uses qualitative  relational  behavior  modeling, 
and  extends them  to include  a small  set  of high-level  (fault) models  of the  software  com- 
ponents. In contrast to the other  two perspectives, the component structure is represented 
explicitly and  used to compose the whole system model automatically from a component li- 
brary.  Based on this, also the analyses of hazards and impacts  are computed automatically. 
Further  details  are described in Chapter 5. 
	  
	  
	  
Cross-cutting Aspects    Common  to all three  perspectives is the interpretation  of the pro- 
vided data  by means of formally founded system models:   The first perspective (Section  3) 
gives explicit guidance for this. The second and third perspectives provide a modeling frame- 
work (Sections 4.1 and  5.2) where  this has  to be done  manually.   Along with this goes the 
identification of a proper system boundary  (Section  4, Table 3.3 and Figures  5.1 and 5.2) and 
structure (Section  5.5.3).  This is the basis  for capturing  relationships between hazards and 
system functions (Section  4) as well as the causal chains from faults and hazards up to their 
impacts  (Section  5).  Finally, the perspectives aim at enhancing the provided  data  by addi- 
tional models  suited  for reuse and automation (Sections 4 and 5). Beginning with Section  2, 
we discuss a case study on a Commercial Road  Vehicle  from these three  perspectives. 
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2  Introduction to the Case Study: Commercial Road 
Vehicle Safety 
	  
	  
	  
Our industrial project partner ITK Engineering AG [ITK12] proposed the domain  of commer- 
cial road vehicles  (trucks  for short) as the subject of our case study,  particularly, drive trains 
of trucks.  The structure of a drive train is sketched in Figure 2.1. 
	  
Central ECU 
	  
Engine ECU Transmission ECU Retarder ECU Brake ECU 
	  
1. Fan 
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8. Wheel 
Power steering 
pump 
Inverter 	  
6. Secondary Oil Retarder 
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24V- 
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Figure 2.1: Physical  and control component structure for the truck drive train 
	  
The main subsystem of a drive train (in dark gray color) comprises 
	  
the  diesel  engine   (2),  equipped with a  fan  (1),  providing  an  accelerating or braking 
torque, 
	  
the clutch (3) which may interrupt the propagation of torque, 
	  
the transmission (5) and  the generator  (4) allowing to switch between forward and  re- 
verse torque  (and idling), 
	  
the retarder  (6), a braking device  that, when applied,  counteracts the rotational  motion 
through  a propeller moving in oil, 
	  
the drive axle together with the wheel (8), which transforms rotational  acceleration into 
translational acceleration (and vice versa), and 
	  
the wheel  brakes (7). 
	  
Components are  controlled  by specialized electronic  control units  (ECU), which communi- 
cate  with a central  ECU that  processes, for instance, the  driver demands.  The  light-gray 
components are related  to electrical  aspects and have  not been treated in the first phase of 
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ID Hazard 
1 Unintended start 
2 Start opposite to the intended direction of travel 
3 Unintended acceleration 
4 Unintended deceleration 
5 Loss of steering power 
6 Failure of the braking system 
7 Electric shock 
8 Fire 
	  
Table 2.1:  List of hazards 
	  
ID List of relevant driving situations 
1 Car wash 
2 Refueling  (petrol/diesel) 
3 Parking  on a slope 
4 Crossing an intersection 
5 Passing cars  parked on the roadside 
6 Dense traffic with vulnerable persons on the road (e. g., pedestrians, cyclists) 
7 Deceleration at, e. g., traffic lights, stop sign 
8 Driving in reverse 
9 Driving in roundabouts 
10 Freeway exit, deceleration 
11 Approaching a traffic jam 
	  
Table 2.2:  List of relevant  driving situations as a part of the environment conditions 
	  
	  
the project.  The industrial  partner also  supplied us with exemplary problems and  results  in 
safety analysis. Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 show part of the lists of hazards and the relevant  en- 
vironment  conditions  to be analyzed (provided by ITK Engineering AG [ITK12]), respectively. 
Part of the work in the case study was to turn these informal descriptions into a semi-formal 
representation that would support  automated model-based reasoning (see Section  3). 
	  
Other  tables summarize results  of the manually  generated analysis (provided  by ITK Engi- 
neering  AG [ITK12]).  In Table  2.3,  each row links a hazard (column  2), which are  charac- 
terized  in column 3, with the components whose faults may be responsible for it (column 4). 
Table 2.4 captures the results  of the impact analysis: for a hazard (column 2) and particular 
environment conditions  (column  3), the  impacts, e. g.,  persons injured  by the  vehicle,  are 
determined (column 6). 
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ID 
	  
Hazard 
	  
Additional  Information 
Components with Potential to trig- 
ger the Hazard (additional  conditions 
in parentheses) 
Physical 
System 
Function 
	  
1 
	  
Unintended 
start 
Vehicle standing, unin- 
tended torque  on drive axle 
(independent of direction) 
Generator (gear  engaged), 
Clutch (gear  engaged, engine is run- 
ning or starter is actuated) 
	  
Drive 
	  
2 
Unintended 
start-up  less 
than 5 km/h 
Vehicle standing, unin- 
tended torque  on drive axle 
(independent of direction) 
	  
Starter (clutch engaged) 
	  
Drive 
	  
	  
3 
Start op- 
posite to 
intended 
direction 
	  
Vehicle standing, torque 
on drive axle opposite to 
intended direction 
	  
Generator, 
Clutch (clutch open) 
	  
	  
Drive 
	  
	  
4 
	  
No start on 
demand 
	  
Vehicle standing, missing 
torque  on drive axle 
Generator (gear  engaged, clutch 
open), 
Clutch (gear  engaged, engine run- 
ning) 
	  
	  
Drive 
	  
5 
	  
Unintended 
acceleration 
Vehicle standing, unin- 
tended torque  on drive axle 
in direction of wheel rotation 
	  
Generator (gear  engaged), 
Engine  (clutch and gear  engaged) 
	  
Accelerate 
	  
6 
No accel- 
eration  on 
demand 
Vehicle moving, no torque 
on drive axle in direction of 
wheel rotation 
Retarder, 
Generator, 
Clutch (engine  running) 
	  
Accelerate 
	  
	  
7 
	  
Unintended 
deceleration 
	  
Vehicle moving, unintended 
torque  on drive axle oppo- 
site to wheel rotation 
Retarder, 
Generator, 
Engine  (clutch engaged), 
Clutch 
	  
	  
Accelerate 
	  
	  
8 
	  
No decel- 
eration  on 
demand 
	  
Vehicle moving, no torque 
opposite to wheel rotation 
on drive axle 
Retarder, 
Generator, 
Engine  (clutch engaged), 
Clutch (engine  braking,  open  clutch 
results in loss of engine brake) 
	  
	  
Brake 
	  
9 
	  
Unintended 
stopping 
Vehicle moving, unintended 
torque  on drive axle oppo- 
site to wheel rotation 
Generator (gear  engaged), 
Engine  (clutch closed, engine off (it 
brakes)) 
	  
Stop 
	  
	  
10 
Delayed 
stopping 
(operational 
brakes) 
Vehicle decelerates until 
stop,  unintended torque  on 
drive axle in direction of 
wheel rotation 
	  
Generator (gear  engaged), 
Clutch (engine  running) 
	  
	  
Stop 
	  
11 
	  
Unintended 
engine start 
	   Generator (clutch engaged, gear  in 
neutral  position), 
Starter 
	  
Start en- 
gine 
	  
	  
	  
12 
No engine 
start on de- 
mand → 
vehicle op- 
eration  not 
possible 
	   	   Generator (clutch engaged, gear  in 
neutral  position), 
Starter (clutch open), 
Engine  (no injection), 
Clutch (neutral  gear) 
	  
	  
Start en- 
gine 
Table 2.3 – continued on next page 
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ID 
	  
Hazard 
	  
Additional  Information 
Components with Potential to trig- 
ger the Hazard (additional  conditions 
in parentheses) 
Physical 
System 
Function 
	  
	  
	  
13 
Unintended 
loss of 24 V 
supply → 
No supply to 
power steer- 
ing pump 
	   	  	  
24 V battery, 
DC/DC converter, 
HV battery 
	  
24 V power 
supply for 
auxiliary 
equipment 
	  
14 
	  
Gear change 
not possible 
	   Generator, 
Engine, 
Clutch 
Support 
of gear 
change 
	  
	  
15 
	  
Electric 
shock 
	   HV-Battery 
Inverter 
DC-DC-Converter 
Generator 
	  
Driving, 
parking, ... 
	  
Table 2.3: Results of manual hazard analysis (translated from external project  documentation in Ger- 
man [ITK12]): hazards, description of hazards, faulty components and violated system func- 
tions 
	  
	  
ID Hazard Environment 
condition 
Impact E S C ASIL 
H1.1 Unintended engine 
start 
Vehicle   is   in  pit 
lane 
Injury  of  persons  in 
pit lane 
E2 S2 C3 B 
H1.2 Unintended engine 
start 
Workshop Injury of mechanics E3 S2 C3 QM 
H1.3 Unintended engine 
start 
Vehicle in starting 
grid 
Collision   with   other 
racing cars 
E2 S1 C2 QM 
H1.4 Unintended engine 
start 
Accident  on  race 
course 
Injury of persons 
(e. g., racing teams) 
E2 S2 C2 QM 
H2.1 No  engine  start   on 
demand 
Pit   lane    engine 
stalling 
Subsequent cars  col- 
liding 
E2 S1 C1 QM 
H2.2 No  engine  start   on 
demand 
Vehicle  in start- 
ing grid, engine 
stalls   just  before 
the start 
Subsequent cars  col- 
liding 
E2 S1 C2 QM 
	  
Table 2.4: Results of manual impact  analysis for  racing  car  scenarios  (translated from  external 
project  documentation in German [ITK12]):  hazards occurring  in a certain  environment 
condition  cause a  specific  impact.    They  are  assessed with respect to  likelihood  (E), 
severity (S), controllability (C) and classified according to ISO 26262 using the Automotive 
Safety  Integrity Level (ASIL) scheme. Basic hazards are listed in Table 2.1 
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3  Formalizing Hazards as Behavioral Properties 
	  
	  
	  
	  
Section  3.1 provides  an  overview  of the  concepts used and  the  procedure followed in this 
perspective. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 exemplify this procedure in the context of our case study. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
3.1  Overview of the Concepts and the Procedure 
	  
	  
	  
As an input for our case study,  we take  the hazard  table  among  the provided  data [ITK12] 
for a commercial road  vehicle  (Sections 1.3 and  2).  The  purpose and  contribution  of this 
perspective is a natural  language-oriented interpretation of the informal hazard table in order 
to optimize  it and  to find out whether  some  hazards are  only special cases of other  ones. 
The focus lies on accurate transcription rather  than optimal modeling. 
	  
We can  start with an informal specification of behavioral properties or with a general model 
of the system under  consideration.  Then  we specify  the system behavior  in a semi-formal 
way by transforming the natural-language requirements either  into a structured form using 
pre-defined textual  patterns  as  presented in [Fle08], or into message sequence chart  rep- 
resentation (MSC, [HT03]) according to the approach presented in [Spi10].  The purpose of 
using  MSCs  for system specification is to obtain  an overview  in comparison to simple  tex- 
tual patterns.  However,  it better  suited  for systems with a need to discuss many  complex 
interaction  scenarios being part of major system use  cases. In the presented case study, we 
restrict our approach to using textual patterns as described below. 
	  
Subsequently, a semi-formal  specification can  be  translated into FO C U S    [BS01],  a formal 
framework  for specification and  development of distributed  interactive  discrete-event sys- 
tems,  a general class of systems capturing  many  aspects of cyber-physical systems.  A for- 
mal representation enables the automated verification of system architecture and realization 
against system requirements by translation of both artifacts into the language of a theorem 
prover, e. g., Isabelle/HOL  [NPW02] via the framework “FO C U S  on Isabelle” [Spi07]. 
	  
An informal specification consists of a set of words, which can be distinguished into two cat- 
egories: content  words  and  keywords  (relation  words).  Content  words  are  system-specific 
words or phrases, e. g., “system is initialized” or “off-button is pressed”.  The set of all content 
words  forms the system interface, which can  be understood as  a domain  specific,  system- 
dependent vocabulary that has  to be defined in addition.  Keywords are domain-independent 
and  form relationships between content  words  such  as  e. g., “if”, “then” and  “else”. A semi- 
formal specification consists of a number of requirements described using the following tex- 
3  Formalizing  Hazards as Behavioral Properties 
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Mode Name Explanation 
Off15 
On15 
Stop Drive 
Acceleration 
Deceleration 
ConstDrive 
The clamp 15 of the vehicle is off. 
The clamp 15 of the vehicle is on. 
The vehicle does not move,  clamp 15 of the vehicle is on. 
The vehicle is driving, clamp 15 of the vehicle is on. 
The vehicle accelerates, clamp 15 of the vehicle is on. 
The vehicle decelerates, clamp 15 of the vehicle is on. 
The vehicle is driving at const.  speed, clamp 15 of the vehicle is on. 
	  
Table 3.1: Explanation of the vehicle mode  names 
	  
	  
	  
tual pattern, which can be better  understood by engineers unfamiliar with formal methods: 
	  
W H I LE    Some  state  or system mode 
I F              Some  event  occurs or some state  changes 
T H EN       Some  event  occurs or some state  changes 
ELSE      Some  event  occurs or some state  changes 
	  
An event  describes a point in time,  in which the  system observes or does something; the 
duration  of the  event  is not important,  e. g.,  “driver presses a  button”.   A state describes 
a system or component state within some time  period,  e. g., “a button  is pressed”.  Using 
such  a description to structure the information from an informal specification, we can find out 
missing  information at lower cost.  Furthermore, we identify possible synonyms that must be 
unified before  proceeding to a formal specification. Analysis of the semi-formal  specification 
should  also yield sentences, which need to be reformulated or extended. 
	  
	  
	  
3.2  Case Study: Modeling System Modes 
	  
	  
First  of all, we  discuss specific  system states considered as  modes.  Figure  3.1  present 
the  hierarchy  of them,  where  Figure  3.2  shows the  corresponding general state transition 
diagram  for a vehicle  and  serves, as  a first step,  for the  modeling  and  analysis performed 
in the  second perspective (Section  4).   The  meaning of the  mode  names is presented in 
Table 3.2. 
	  
Note,  that  the  provided  data  (Section  2) only refers  to the  modes Off15,  Stop,  and  Drive. 
This viewpoint lacks some  more details. 
	  
	  
	  
3.3  Case Study: From Hazards to Safety Goals 
	  
	  
The  following list shows the transcriptions of the informal hazard list (Table  2.3) into semi- 
formal temporal or behavioral property  assertions.  We wanted  to maintain  traceability  and 
verifiability within the  original language, particularly,  for our  project  partners.  Hence, we 
3.3  Case Study:  From Hazards to Safety  Goals 
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Figure 3.1: System Modes:  Hierarchy 
	  
	  
	  
 
	  
Figure 3.2: Mode transition  diagram 
	  
	  
	  
included  sentences and phrases from the original documents, all written in German, into the 
language analysis below.  For readers not used to the German language, the translations of 
the corresponding parts  of these documents are referenced to be looked up in Table 2.3. 
	  
Hazard 1  (Table 2.3 ID1) Ungewolltes Anfahren: 
Fahrzeug steht,   ungewollte Momentenabgabe  unabhängig von  der  Richtung  an  der 
Antriebsachse. 
Reformulating this hazard to the corresponding safety  property  we obtain  the following 
sentence: 
Fahrzeug steht,   ungewollte Momentenabgabe  unabhängig von  der  Richtung  an  der 
Antriebsachse ist ausgeschlossen. 
We can represent it semi-formally as follows: 
IF Fahrzeug steht 
3  Formalizing  Hazards as Behavioral Properties 
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THEN NOT (ungewollte Momentenabgabe) 
	  
In English: 
IF the vehicle  is standing 
THEN NOT (unintentional  torque output) 
More precisely: 
(P1) 
IF the vehicle’s mode is Stop  AND NOT (torque output request) 
THEN NOT (torque output) 
(Semi-)Formalization of hazard: 
(H1) 
IF the vehicle’s mode is Stop  AND NOT (torque output request) 
THEN (torque output) 
	  
	  
	  
Hazard 2  (Table 2.3 ID2) Ungewolltes Anfahren  bis 5 km/h: 
Fahrzeug steht,   ungewollte Momentenabgabe  unabhängig von  der  Richtung  an  der 
Antriebsachse. 
The difference  to H1 is a refined  name and  that we restrict  the situation  to the vehicle 
speed ≤  5 km/h. Thus,  we get the following hazard assertion: 
(H2) 
IF the vehicle’s mode is Stop  AND NOT (torque output request) 
THEN (torque output) AND (vehicle  speed ≤  5 km/h) 
The reason for this restriction was not fully clear.  However,  as property P1 also captures 
hazard H2, a restricted version  of P1 is neither  necessary nor acceptable. 
	  
Hazard 3  (Table 2.3 ID3) Anfahren  entgegen der gewünschten Fahrtrichtung: 
Fahrzeug steht,  Momentenabgabe entgegen der gewünschten Richtung  an der Antrieb- 
sachse. 
(Semi-)Formalization of hazard: 
(H3) 
IF the vehicle’s mode is Stop  AND (torque output request) 
AND (requested torque direction is R1) 
THEN (torque output) AND (torque direction is opposite to R1) 
Note that the requested direction (see Figure 3.3) captures the direction of the vehicle. 
If requested direction has  more values than forward and backward  (e. g., left, right ), we 
would have  to explicitly define  pairs  of opposite values.  However,  we can  specify  the 
hazard H 3 in more general: 
(H3’) 
IF the vehicle’s mode is Stop  AND (torque output request) 
AND (requested torque direction is R1) 
THEN (torque output) AND (torque direction /= R1) 
The corresponding property: 
(P2) 
IF the vehicle’s mode is Stop  AND (torque output request) 
AND (requested torque direction is R1) 
THEN (torque output) AND (torque direction is R1) 
3.3  Case Study:  From Hazards to Safety  Goals 
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Hazard 4  (Table 2.3 ID4) Kein Anfahren  auf Anforderung: 
Fahrzeug steht,  keine  Momentenabgabe an der Antriebsachse auf Anforderung. 
(Semi-)Formalization of hazard: 
(H4) 
IF the vehicle’s mode is Stop  AND (torque output request) 
THEN NOT (torque output) 
The corresponding safety  property  is the generalization of the property  P2 (we do not 
care  here  of the vehicle direction). 
(P2’) 
IF the vehicle’s mode is Stop  AND (torque output request) 
THEN (torque output) 
	  
Hazard 5  (Table 2.3 ID5) Ungewollte  Beschleunigung: 
Fahrzeug fährt, ungewollte Momentenabgabe in Raddrehrichtung an der Antriebsachse. 
(Semi-)Formalization of hazard: 
(H5) 
IF the vehicle  is in the mode Drive AND NOT (torque output request) 
AND (direction is R) 
THEN (torque output) AND (torque direction is R) 
Please note that we cannot  reformulate this hazard as follows: 
(H5wrong) 
IF the vehicle  is in the mode Drive AND NOT (torque output request) 
AND (direction is R) 
THEN (vehicle  speed increases) AND (torque direction is R) 
because the vehicle  speed can  also  increase because of the environment’s influence, 
e.g.  if the vehicle goes downhill. Moreover,  if the vehicle goes uphill, its speed can stay 
constant or decrease even  when hazard H5 occurs—essential to this hazard is exactly 
the problem of an unrequested torque  output.  However,  we can reformulate1 the hazard 
in the following way: 
(H5’) 
IF the vehicle  is in the mode Drive AND NOT (acceleration request) 
AND (direction is R) 
THEN (torque output) AND (torque direction is R) 
We can generalize H5’ omitting the information about the direction of vehicle (of vehicle’s 
wheels): 
(P3) 
IF the vehicle  is in the mode Drive AND NOT (torque output request) 
THEN NOT (torque output) 
	  
Hazard 6  (Table 2.3 ID6) Keine Beschleunigung auf Anforderung: 
Fahrzeug fährt, keine  Momentenabgabe in Raddrehrichtung an der Antriebsachse auf 
Anforderung. This hazard is dual to H5. Its (semi-)formalization: 
(H6) 
IF the vehicle  is in the mode Drive AND (torque output request) 
AND (direction is R) 
	  
1 The Figures  3.3 and  3.4 show  how the system boundary is defined  to specify  hazards and  safety  goals  and 
which parts  of this boundary are used in the various  semi-formal assertions,  e. g., H5 vs. H5’. 
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THEN NOT ((torque output) AND (torque direction is R)) 
This is equal  to 
(H6’) 
IF the vehicle  is in the mode Drive AND (torque output request) 
AND (direction is R) 
THEN NOT (torque output) OR (torque direction /= R) 
We can reformulate the hazard in the following way, analog  to H5’ : 
(H6”) 
IF the vehicle  is in the mode Drive AND (acceleration request) 
AND (direction is R) 
THEN NOT ((torque output) AND (torque direction is R)) 
The  corresponding property  is dual  to the  property  P3  and  differs from the  property 
P2 only in the system mode.   We also  generalize it omitting the information  about  the 
direction of vehicle (of vehicle’s wheels): 
(P4) 
IF the vehicle  is in the mode Drive AND (torque output request) 
THEN (torque output) 
	  
Hazard 7  (Table 2.3 ID7) Ungewollte  Verzögerung: 
Fahrzeug fährt,  ungewollte Momentenabgabe entgegen  der  Raddrehrichtung an  der 
Antriebsachse. 
(Semi-)Formalization of hazard: 
(H7) 
IF the vehicle  is in the mode Drive AND NOT (torque output request) AND (direction is 
R) 
THEN (torque output) AND (torque direction is opposite to R) 
(P5) 
IF the vehicle  is in the mode Drive AND NOT (torque output request) AND (direction is 
R) 
THEN NOT (torque output) AND (torque direction is R) 
	  
Hazard 8  (Table 2.3 ID8) Keine Verzögerung auf Anforderung: 
Fahrzeug fährt, keine  Momentenabgabe entgegen der Raddrehrichtung an der Antrieb- 
sachse auf Anforderung. 
(Semi-)Formalization of hazard: 
(H8) 
IF the vehicle  is in the mode Drive AND NOT (torque output request) 
AND (directionReq is opposite to R) AND (direction is R) 
THEN NOT ((torque output) AND (torque direction is opposite to R)) 
The corresponding property: 
(P6) 
IF the vehicle  is in the mode Drive AND NOT (torque output request) 
AND (directionReq is opposite to R) AND (direction is R) 
THEN (torque output) AND (torque direction is opposite to R) 
	  
Hazard 9  (Table 2.3 ID9) Ungewolltes Anhalten: 
Fahrzeug fährt,  ungewollte Momentenabgabe entgegen  der  Raddrehrichtung an  der 
Antriebsachse bis zum  Fahrzeugstillstand. 
3.3  Case Study:  From Hazards to Safety  Goals 
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This hazard can  be seen as  a special case (refinement) of the hazard H 7, thus,  if we 
have  proven  that the hazard H 7 is excluded, we can  omit the proving of H 9, however, 
its proof is necessary only if it is to complicated to argue of H 7. It can  be represented 
in a (semi-)formal  way as follows2: 
(H9) 
IF the vehicle  is in the mode Drive AND NOT (torque output request) AND (direction is 
R) 
THEN (torque output) AND (torque direction is opposite to R) 
AND (vehicle’s mode is Stop)N 
This hazard corresponds to the property  P 5 we define above. 
	  
Hazard 10  (Table 2.3 ID10) Verzögertes Anhalten  (mittels Bremssystem): 
Fahrzeug verzögert bis zum  Fahrzeugstillstand, ungewollte Momentenabgabe  in Rad- 
drehrichtung  an der Antriebsachse. 
The additional  constraint until the current speed is equal to 0 can be omitted here. 
(H10) 
IF the vehicle’s mode is Decelerate AND (direction is R) 
AND NOT ((torque output request) AND (requested torque direction /= R)) 
THEN (torque output) AND (torque direction is R) 
This corresponds to the following property: 
(P7) 
IF the vehicle’s mode is Decelerate AND (direction = R) 
AND NOT ((torque output request) AND (requested torque direction /= R)) 
THEN NOT(torque output) AND (torque direction is R)) 
	  
Hazard 11  (Table 2.3 ID11) Ungewollter Motorstart: 
Klemme 15 aus,  ungewollte Motorstart. 
The  start  of the  motor  corresponds in our model  to the  change of the  system mode 
Off15  to On15  , more  precisely, from mode  Off15  to Stop,  therefore we can  represent 
this hazard (semi-)formally as follows: 
(H11) 
IF the vehicle  is in the mode Off15 AND NOT Clamp15On 
THEN the vehicle’s mode is Stop 
The corresponding property: 
(P8) 
IF the vehicle’s mode is Off15 AND NOT Clamp15On 
THEN the vehicle’s mode is Off15 
	  
Hazard 12  (Table 2.3 ID12) Kein Motorstart auf Anforderung: 
Klemme 15 an, kein Motorstart auf Anforderung. 
This hazard is dual to the hazard H 11: 
(H12) 
IF the vehicle’s mode is Off15 AND Clamp15On 
THEN the vehicle’s mode is Off15 
The corresponding property  is dual to the property  P 8: 
(P9) 
	  
2 The  notation  eventN  denotes the  proposition that  event will take  place  in N  steps of the  system, i. e.,  in N 
time units. 
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IF the vehicle’s mode is Off15 AND Clamp15On 
THEN the vehicle’s mode is Stop 
	  
	  
	  
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: System interface  (initial vocabulary) 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Figure 3.4: System interface  (vocabulary after a refinement) 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
The transformation of the informal hazard assertions into semi-formal  assertions using  the 
textual patterns contributed in a more  precise definition of the system boundary. Based on 
that, the Figures  3.3 and  3.4 represent the system interface  in a graphical  manner. For the 
interface  ports, we define simple types: 
Direction = {f orward, backward}, 
Bool = {true, f alse}, 
N  = {n | n is a natural  number}, 
State  = {off 15, on15 = clamp15on, stop, drive, accelerate, constdrive, decelerate}, 
pedalP osition = {released, pressed}. 
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ID Formalized Hazard(s) Abstracted Hazard Corresponding Safety Property 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
H 1 
H 2 
H 3 
H 4 
H 5 
H 6 (dual to H 5) or H 6t 
H 7 
H 8 
H 9 
H 10 
H 11 
H 12 (dual to H 11) 
	  
	  
H 1 
H 3t 
	  
	  
H 5t 
H 6tt 
	  
	  
	  
H 7 
P 1 
P 1 
P 2 
P 2t (generalization of P 2) 
P 3 
P 4 (dual to P 3) 
P 5 
P 6 
P 5 
P 7 
P 8 
P 9 (dual to P 8) 
	  
Table 3.2: Relationships between the hazards semi-formalized based on Table  2.3 and  cor- 
responding safety  properties 
	  
	  
	  
First Perspective (Section  3) Comments Second Perspective (Section  4) 
speed: N 
direction:  Direction 
directionReq: Direction 
torqueOutput: B 
torqueOutputReq: B 
torqueDirReq: Direction 
torqueDir:  Direction 
brake:  PedalPosition 
gas: PedalPosition 
targetSpeed: N 
Clamp15On: B 
speed of the vehicle 
direction of the vehicle 
requested direction of the vehicle 
current  torque 
requested torque 
requested torque  direction 
current  torque  direction 
used for modeling  accReq, decReq 
used for modeling  accReq, decReq 
target  speed of the vehicle 
true corresponds to On15 
vehicle.speed 
vehicle.direction 
steeringwheel.pos 
forcemomentum.wheels 
forcemomentum.extra 
	  
	  
	  
brakepedal.pos 
gaspedal.pos 
acc.targetspeed 
key.pos 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
	   vehicle.pos 
vehicle.load 
keyslot.status 
clutchpedal.pos 
gearlevel.pos 
brakepedal.force 
stopbrake.status 
	  
Table 3.3: Interface  ports:  Vocabulary  bridging the gap to the second perspective (Section  4) 
	  
	  
	  
3.4  Summary 
	  
	  
	  
The hazard list of Table 2.3, which is based on Table 2.1, has been processed as follows: Out 
of the 15 listed hazards, 11 have  been transformed using  textual  patterns. Hazard  H9 has 
been added as  a refinement of H7.  To reduce redundancy, due  to lack of knowledge or to 
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keep  the model  simple enough for a case study,  the hazards "no acceleration on demand", 
"involuntary  loss  of 24V", "gear  change not possible"  and  "electric  shock"  have  been left 
out.  This does not harm  the validity of the model  and  the method. The result  of analyzing 
the above 12 hazards is presented in Table  3.2.  Although we maintained original language 
assertions for traceability reasons, the presented approach itself can be applied to assertions 
in English or other natural  languages. 
	  
In this perspective, we showed how to transform  informal text into controlled  language using 
textual  patterns.  This improved  our understanding of the system interface  including global 
system states and  modes, a  more  precise definition of interface  ports  as  well as  a  more 
complete definition of wanted  or unwanted behaviors observable over these ports.  To switch 
to the second perspective (Section  4), we can orientate on this interface  definition as well as 
the list of hazards and safety  goals  represented in a semi-formal  way.  Figure 3.3 shows the 
resulting  specification of the  system interface  gained  during this transformation.  Table  3.3 
relates the first and the second perspective (Section  4) by referring to the interface  ports. 
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label 
use 
fail 
save 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
4  Hazard Analysis based on State Machines 
	  
	  
	  
The  second perspective shows a method consisting of a framework   and  a procedure for 
qualitative  behavioral modeling  and hazard analysis. This perspective is based on a variant 
of state machines and exemplified  by a commercial road vehicle as introduced in Section  2. 
The  method  was  developed in the course of the project  mentioned in Section  1.3 and  has 
already  been published in isolation and in more detail in [Gle13]. We show an extract  of this 
article, summarize the most important concepts of the method  and exemplify it by embedding 
it into the current  case study. 
	  
	  
	  
4.1  Framework Concepts 
	  
	  
To address the  problems and  challenges stated in Section  1, the  framework  comprises a 
qualitative behavioral  model  of the system’s functionality, its environment and a set  of prop- 
erty assertions, altogether used as  a specification. We denote the functionality of the envi- 
ronment  by fE  and the functionality of the system under  consideration by fI  . In the following, 
we use  ∗  ∈  {I , E  }  and f∗   will denote a part of these functionalities  identified by label. The 
behavioral model is based on a system interface  defined on the basis  of variables also called 
interface  phenomena and consists of three  functional aspects: 
	  
Usage functionality  f∗   (also called nominal  functionality), 
	  
defective functionality  f∗   (for explicit defect  modeling,  e.g.,  to describe failures), and 
	  
safety functionality  f∗   as an enhancement thereof  to avoid or mitigate hazards. 
	  
At the system side,  parts  of the functionality are  called usage functions, at the environment 
side  environment tactics.   The  portion of a function or tactic  belonging  one  of the  aspects 
is called  functional  fragment.  To characterize important  points  in time, some  valuations of 
the interface  phenomena are used as local situations in property assertions and simulations 
of the model.  Based on this specification, a hazard combines a hazardous element with an 
initiating mechanism to threaten a target.  The risk consists in a potential  negative outcome 
from this mechanism’s performance, i.e., an impact on the target or, synonymously, a mishap 
for it. Risks are usually quantified  by severity  and probability values. 
	  
	  
	  
4.2  Procedural Steps 
	  
	  
Based on Figure 4.1, the procedure is explained in the following: 
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Stage	  1:	  Understand	  System	  
	  
Step	  1:	   Step	  2:	  
Specify	  
Functions	  	  
Model	  Defects
	  
	   Stage	  2:	  Identify	  Hazardous	  Behaviour	  
	  
Step	  3:	   Step	  4:	  
Iden	  tif	  y	  
Imp	  acts	  
Ass	  es	  s	  Hazards
	  
	   Stage	  3:	  Improve	  System	  Functionality	  
	  
Step	  5:	   Step	  6:	  
Specify	  Saf	  ety	   Derive	  Safety	  
Go	  al	  s	   Measures	  
Specification	  and	  Defect	  M	  ode	  l	  
S 
	  
Hazard	  Knowledge	   Vali	  d	  Spe	  cification	  
S‘ 
	  
	  
Figure 4.1: A procedure in six steps for using the framework (adopted from [Gle13]) 
	  
	  
	  
Step  1  Specify the Usage Functionality — Guiding Questions: What is considered as nom- 
inal behavior?   Transform  the informal function definitions known from requirements 
engineering into use  cases and the set of informal property  assertions into semi-formal 
(e.g.,  as  described in Section  3) or formal assertions.  Determine the outmost  system 
boundary and  its interface  phenomena (right column  of Table  3.3).  Transform  the use 
cases into a hierarchy  of usage functions  and  identify modes of operation  and  opera- 
tions to derive  a model  of interaction via usage functions  and  environment tactics.  For 
each leaf of the hierarchy, identify actions  (transitions), their repetition  and order by the 
help of modes. 
	  
Methodical details  on how use  cases can be elaborated are described in, e.g., [Coc00]. 
Further information on the specification of a function hierarchy  can be taken from [Bro05, 
Rit08, Bro10, HM03]. 
	  
Step  2  Model the Defective Functionality — Guiding Questions: Which failures are possible? 
Which actions  could be performed in an unexpected manner? Apply several strategies 
to derive a defect  model:  introduction of indeterminacy or physical side effects,  fault 
knowledge and  other  mutations. This step  avoids  the implicit assumption that hazards 
are  always  failures,  as  it was  made in the  first perspective (Section  3).   Hence, we 
separate hazard analysis from reliability analysis to a certain  extent. 
	  
Step  3  Identify Potential Impacts  — Guiding Questions: Which impacts  are possible? Which 
actions  could  be  performed in an  impacting  manner?   Determine physically  relevant 
operations and  identify conditions  of harming  events based on interface  phenomena, 
e.g.,  areas which could get contaminated or where  objects collide, get sounded, glared 
or shot ; places where  objects could  get  clamped, sheared, scraped or cut ; surfaces 
where  objects could get burned,  vibrated,  electrically shocked or dissolved.  Derive 
candidate hazards which indicate  hazardous executions or suppressions and separate 
hazardous from safe  performance of the regarded operation. Define local situations. 
	  
Proposed Formal Instrumentation:  We express and  specify  impacts  as  constraints on 
the available  interface  phenomena or state variables known from Step  1.  A constraint 
can  be  any first-order  predicate calculus  formula using  terms  (incl. arithmetic)  and  in- 
equalities (incl. equalities). In order to express and specify hazards, we propose to use 
linear temporal  logic. This will be exemplified in the case study in Section  4.3 where  we 
use  the temporal operators and assertions of the kinds: 
	  
“A U B” to denote “A holds until B where  B must eventually  hold”, 
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use.StopBrake 
	  
	  
“•A” to denote “A holds in the previous  state”,  and 
	  
“DA” to denote “A always  holds”. 
	  
Detailed  formal definitions of linear-time temporal logic can be found in [BK08, Str06]. 
	  
Step  4  Refine, Classify and Assess Hazards  — Guiding Questions: Which failures are haz- 
ards?  Which hazards are failures?  Which hazards are no failures?  Which hazards are 
relevant  to be  treated?   This step  involves  the  investigation of hazards and  their rela- 
tionship to defects and  nominal operation of the system. Starting  from a more  abstract 
model, lower-level actions  and modes of the leaf usage functions  or environment tactics 
are analyzed to extract  defective parts  of operations. This leads to refined assertions of 
hazards, more precise classification  as well as a better  quantification  and determination 
of their relevance. 
	  
Step  5  Specify Safety Goals  — Guiding Questions: How and where  to allocate  behavioral 
responsibility?   This step  involves the transformation of identified hazards into goal as- 
sertions.  One  way  how  to do  this  has  already  been demonstrated in Section  3.   In 
[Gle13], the smoothening step  of using  controlled  natural  language is left out.  Instead, 
a direct transition  to the use  of temporal logic takes place.  The safety  goals  can then be 
used as  guarantee specifications for the respective usage functions  or as  assumption 
specifications for the respective environment tactics. 
	  
Step  6  Design  the  Safety Functionality  —  Guiding  Questions:  How  does the  functional 
safety concept have  to look like?  Strategies for hazard mitigation deal  with the ques- 
tion of how the system or the environment can be equipped to detect hazards and take 
over the control to avoid or mitigate impacts. This results  in the introduction of fail-safe 
transitions and passive or preventive transitions.  The implementation of such transitions 
usually amounts to state  observation or runtime diagnosis. 
	  
After the last step  the specification is transformed in a way to reduce hazards, to assess and 
to mitigate hazardous weaknesses. 
	  
	  
	  
4.3  Case Study: Application of the Procedure 
	  
	  
The procedure of Figure 4.1 is now exemplified  (further details  in [Gle13]).  The system is a 
commercial road vehicle (“truck” for short) and the environment the part of the world including 
the driver, a truck is usually performing in. 
	  
	  
	  
Step  1    The  driving missions of a truck and  possible tactics  of its driver are  provided  as 
use  cases (Tables  4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). As physical  interface  phenomena, consider two vectors 
for speed, PvI    and  Pvoo , and  two for position,  pPosI    and  pPosoo .  Figure  4.2 shows the function 
hierarchy  of a  truck.   The  tactics  are  constructed similarly and  shown  in Figure  4.3.   The 
upper  levels of the hierarchy  help identifying complex  operations observable at the interface 
of a truck by co-executing its functions  and  the  environment’s tactics.   Let us  consider the 
operation move.  At leaf level, Figure 4.4a  shows the usage function fI   . 
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UC #27 Use truck (usage goal #27, fE ||fI ) Missions      Truck 
Scope I ; level: primary task in f∗ ; primary actor:  E use 
Preconditions Enough fuel, battery  on, etc. 
Minimal Guarantees Neither the trucker,  his goods, nor the environment will be harmed. 
Success Guarantees The trucker accomplishes his mission  by using the truck. 
Trigger The trucker activates the vehicle by applying the key. 
Description 
(list of interaction 
descriptions) 
1. The trucker activates the vehicle by applying the key. 
2. She  performs, e.g.,  UC #5,10  to accomplish her missions. 
3. The vehicle reacts properly to her commands. 
4. The trucker deactivates the vehicle. 
	  
	  
Table 4.1: Use case #27 “Use truck” 
	  
UC #5 Park at steep hill (usage goal #5, fE ||fI ) use.Park      use.Drive/Move 
Scope I ; level: primary task in f∗ ; primary actor:  E use 
Preconditions The truck is driving near  a free and proper  parking lot. 
Minimal Guarantees 	  
Success Guarantees The  truck is parked in a parking  lot at a steep hill compatible to the  current 
mission  goal. 
Trigger The trucker stops in front of a parking lot at a steep hill. 
Description 
(list of interaction 
descriptions) 
1. The trucker stops in front of a parking lot at a steep hill. 
2. She  uses gas  pedal,  steering wheel, clutch, gears, brakes (UC#10) and rear 
mirrors to place  the truck into the lot. 
	  
	  
Table 4.2: Use case #5 “Park at steep hill” 
	  
	  
As there  was  no documentation available  in [ITK12], the three  use  cases have  been recon- 
structed from domain knowledge being collected  during the project mentioned in Section  1.3 
as  well as  during other  research projects  in the automotive domain,  in which the chair was 
involved throughout the last years. The same holds for the function hierarchy. 
	  
	  
	  
Step  2 Figure 4.4b shows failure possibilities  as a fragment  fI   . 
	  
	  
	  
Step  3    Search for impacts  stemming from truck operations from Step  1.  As modeled in 
Figure  4.5,  the  operation move  is physically  relevant  because it affects  PvI    and  pPosI  .   An 
impact  of move is a collision defined  as  a combination of too small distances and  too high 
relative velocities  and, thus,  represented by an approximating condition 
	  
µ ≡  |PvI  ­−  Pvoo |  ≥  vok  ∧  |pPosI  ­−  pPosoo |  ≤  maxx∈{oo,I}{diameterx}   (4.1) 
The  candidate hazard as  a condition  χ˜ for hazardous performance of move  would be  tied 
to situations, such  as,  e.g.,  move triggered  or altered  without foreseen user  operation (Table 
4.4).   In Figure  4.5,  the  safe  refinement of the  operation τ  denotes all transitions fulfilling 
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usage function f 
use.StopBrake 
fail.StopBrake 
StopBrake 
	  
	  
UC #10 Use brakes (usage goal #10, fE ||fI ) Missions      use.Accelerate/Brake 
Scope I ; level: primary task in f∗ ; primary actor:  E use 
Preconditions None. 
Minimal Guarantees The truck is slowing down. 
Success Guarantees The truck is properly slowing down or coming to a stable halt. 
Trigger The trucker actuates the brake  pedal. 
Description 
(list of interaction 
descriptions) 
1. The trucker actuates the brake  pedal. 
2. The truck decreases its speed accordingly. 
3. Optional:  When the truck comes to a halt, the trucker decides to activate the 
stop brake. 
	  
	  
Table 4.3: Use case #10 “Use brakes”  always  included  by UC#5 
	  
Step  1 Step  3 Step  4 Step  5 
o µ χ˜ Short Description of Hazard S A G W IC 
move 
move 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Unintended start of movement 
Unintended change of direction 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
high 
high 
	  
Table 4.4: Hazard  assessment 
	  
	  
	  
the predicate userOperation. Consider χ˜ ≡  “Unintended start of movement” formalized as 
hazard assertion 
χ˜ ≡  ¬(move ∨  userOperation) U move  (4.2) 
From UC #5 we know a relevant  local situation  σ ≡  “The truck is standing  in a steep parking 
lot and the stop brake is activated.” 
	  
	  
Step  4 Assertion  4.2  is refined  by move  ≡  PvI     /=  0 and  userOperation  ≡  gasP edal  = 
pressed  ∧  ∃x.(•gearLever  = x) →  gearLever /=  x (Figure  4.5).  The  decomposition of the 
I  
use.Drive/Move containing  move into actions at the leaf level of the function hier- 
archy shows that, e.g., the mode active and the action brake of fI   are physically 
relevant, because in this mode,  this action is responsible to maintain PvI    = 0 or to contribute 
to the operation park. The failure transition  suppressBrake of fI   (Figure  4.4b) 
contributes to χ˜  and  potentially  to impact  µ, e.g.,  because of gravity in σ,  no driver input 
needed to reach move  and  the  driver possibly  not in the  truck to take  over  control.   This 
analysis leads to the assertion 
	  
χ ≡  (¬move ∧  mode(fI   ) = active)  U move  (4.3) 
	  
	  
	  
	  
Step  5 Our safety  goal for the truck implies ¬µ ≡  “no collision” which is broken  down by: 
γ˜ ≡  D(¬move →  (¬move U (userOperation ∧  ¬move))) (4.4) 
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    «inc lude» 
	  
«inc lude» 
	  
«inc lude» 
	  
f^i_use f^i_fail  f^i_save 
	  
	  
E xample 
	  
f^i_u se. D 
rive/M o ve 
	  
	  
«flow » 
tau (* --> C rashed or 
damaged) 
Activate / Deact. 
Vehicle 
	  
Use with 
f^i_fail. 
D rive/Mo ve 
	  
	  
D river 
Assistance 
f^i_fail. UDA 
Indicate 
direction 
	  
	  
Im p ro ve 
	  
	  
	  
f^i_save.SDA 
	  
	  
	  
S tab ilize 
S tir Adjust 
Transmission 
«inc lude» Comfort 	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Use Clutch 
	  
	  
Accelerate / 
Brake 
	  
	  
Steer 
	  
	  
Act/Deact Engine 
	  
Use trailer 
	  
Suspension 	  
	  
Act/Deact Engine 
	  
	  
ABS 
Load up / unload 
	  
f^i_u se. 
StopBrake 
	  
Brake Accelerate 
	  
f^i_u se. A irb ag 
f^i_fail. 
StopBrake 
	  
f^i_fail. A irb ag 
f^i_save. 
StopBrake 
	  
	  
Figure 4.2: Excerpt  of a truck usage function hierarchy 
	  
	  
	  
γ˜ is assigned to fI .  From the list of relevant  hazards like χ (step  4), safety  require- 
I 
StopBrake have  been derived  by assigning a high integrity class. 
	  
	  
Step  6 Analyses, such  as described in Section  5 or [SF11], provide more detailed  charac- 
teristics  of the physical  action  suppressBrake. To realize  fI 
to mitigate or avoid the hazards χ. The fail-safe transition  in fI 
, it has  to be designed 
(Figure 4.6a) could save.StopBrake 
incorporate a fail-silent mechanism suited  to quickly mask  potential  suppressBrake tran- 
sitions. 
	  
	  
	  
4.4  Summary 
	  
	  
First, we used a systematic way to perform behavioral system specification using use  cases 
and  hierarchically  arranged state machines. Based on the resulting  system model,  we tied 
defect  knowledge to specific modes and behaviors of the system. Step  2 avoids  the implicit 
assumption of the equivalence of failures and  hazards as  it was  made in the first perspec- 
tive (Section  3).  This separates hazard analysis from reliability analysis to a certain  extent. 
Using a full-fledged state machine model  is an  enhancement of the  results  shown  in Sec- 
tion 3, as  the  state machine represents many  or even all relevant  system runs  in a quite 
compact manner. It can be used as a behavioral  approximation of the considered system to 
be checked against the hazards and safety properties derived in the first perspective but also 
in Steps 3 and 4 of this perspective. We sometimes use  predicates and terms  in our tempo- 
ral logic assertions. For automation, the formulas still need to be abstracted. However,  this 
is not discussed in detail.  Furthermore, based on the same state machine and the results  of 
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f^e _use f^e _fail  f^e _sav e 
	  
	  
	  
Mi ssion s 
Natural 
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«e xtend » 
	  
«e xtend » 
	  
Truck (general) Pa rk Us e Hig hw a y 
	  
	  
«i n cl ud e» 
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«i n cl ud e» 
	  
Bra ke 
	  
	  
Bra ke w ith 
Sto p Br ake 
Bra ke w ith 
Pe dal 
	  
	  
Figure 4.3: Excerpt  of an environment tactics  hierarchy 
	  
	  
	  
property checking, we sketched how measures can be specified  as refined or superimposed 
transitions for the treatment, i.e., avoidance or mitigation, of hazards. 
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bra ke 
[ve hi cl e .l oad < x] 
/ve hi cl e .spee d -= 
h(v ehi cl e.spe ed, 
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ac tiv e 
	  
	  
	  
ac tiv e 
	  
	  
(a) 
un stabl e Brake [ve hi cl e .l oad >= x ] 
/ve hi cl e .spee d += f(veh i cl e. speed , 
(b) veh i cl e. l oad, vehi cl e.d i recti on) suppressBrake 
	  
Figure 4.4: The usage function fI (a) and possible defects fI (b) 
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Figure 4.5: The usage function fI 
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[ve hi cl e .l oad < x] 
/ve hi cl e .spee d -= 
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active 
act i vate 	  
«n on-E/ E/PE » 
sav eBra ke 
/ve hi cl e .spee d -= 
h(v ehi cl e.spe ed, 
veh i cl e. l oad 
	  
«n on-E/ E/PE » 
sav eBra ke 
/ve hi cl e .spee d -= 
h(v ehi cl e.spe ed, 
	  
	  
un stabl e Brake [ve hi cl e .l oad >= x ] 
/ve hi cl e .spee d += f(veh i cl e. speed , 
(a) veh i cl e. l oad (b) veh i cl e. l oad, vehi cl e.d i recti on) suppressBrake 
	  
Figure 4.6: The safety  fragment  fI (a) and the overall function fI (b) 
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5  Automated Safety Analysis based on 
Component-oriented Modeling 
	  
	  
	  
Safety  analysis may  have  to be  carried  out repetitively  for different  versions and  variants 
during the design  of a system, is knowledge-intensive, and  consumes significant  efforts of 
experts. The objective of providing powerful tools for supporting, or even automating, a major 
part  of the  safety  analysis process is a challenge to artificial intelligence  (AI) approaches, 
since  it involves reasoning about  the physical  world. 
	  
Our third perspective presented in this chapter presents a general AI approach to safety ana- 
lysis, a tool for automated generation of safety  analysis results  as well as its application  and 
evaluation. Since  a modern vehicle is an aggregation of different subsystems that are  con- 
trolled by software  and that interact  with each other and a dynamic  environment, addressing 
this task  can  be seen as  a contribution  to the more  general, important  problem  of safety  of 
cyber-physical systems. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
5.1  Key Ideas 
	  
	  
	  
Our solution  to the  case study  on the  drive train of a truck (Section  2) exploits  qualitative 
modeling  and  a qualitative  spatial  representation.  This reflects  the division of the problem 
and model into two parts,  namely  modeling  and inferring 
	  
abnormal  behavior of the vehicle (called  hazards) as  a consequence of component 
faults and 
	  
the impact of a hazard on its environment. 
	  
The  nature  of the  worst-case  analysis (determining qualitative  effects  of classes of com- 
ponent  faults under  abstract classes of scenarios) enables, and even  stronger requires, the 
use  of qualitative representations and models. 
	  
For instance, in our case study,  qualitative  behavior  models  of the components of the drive 
train are  used to predict  the  effect  of a component fault  on the  motion  of the  entire  vehi- 
cle, e. g., an unintended acceleration.  The  analysis of the impact  of this effect determines 
potential  collisions  due  to the disturbed motion of the vehicle  based on a qualitative  spatial 
representation of positions  of the  vehicle  and  other  objects relative  to the  road  and  their 
interference for different abstract scenarios. 
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Figure 5.1: The  vehicle  as  an  aggregation  of  physical   and  software   components in  an 
environment 
	  
	  
5.2  Requirements and Approach 
	  
	  
The current  practice  and  standards do not directly lend themselves to precise definitions of 
the  involved concepts and  types  of required  inferences, nor do they  imply particular  ways 
of structuring  models  and  processes (Section  1.2).   We do so  following the  perspective il- 
lustrated by Figure 5.1:  a cyber-physical system comprises a number of subsystems,  which 
are  systems composed of physical  (e.g.,  mechanical, electrical,  hydraulic) components and 
software  components, whose interaction  happens exclusively  through  a  usually  relatively 
small set  of sensor signals as  an input to and  actuator signals as  an output of the software 
component(s).  Different subsystems interact  both  via connections between their physical 
components and  via communication between their software  components.  In a vehicle,  the 
components of the drive train with their individual ECUs are examples for such  subsystems. 
At a higher level, the drive train itself can be considered as a subsystem as shown in the first 
two perspectives (Sections 3 and 4). The top-level system is the entire vehicle. 
	  
From the point of view of safety  analysis, it is important  to note that it is solely the physical 
system, i. e., the vehicle (or its physical parts) that interacts with the environment. The em- 
bedded software  never  directly interferes with the environment. As a consequence, hazards, 
misbehaviors that bear  the potential  of damage in the environment, are  defined  exclusively 
at the intersection of the physical  system and the (physical)  environment. Even unexpected 
operations carried  out by the software  – are  never  a hazard per se.   They may only cause 
one via the response of the physical  system to the actuator signals. 
	  
As an  important  consequence, faulty software  behavior  matters if and  only if it may cause 
the physical  system to create a hazard.  Therefore, our approach moves  the (model  of the) 
physical system into  the  center  and  models  software  – and  especially software  faults – 
solely with regard to the physical  model. 
	  
On the  other  hand,  hazards create risks  only through  their impact  on  the  environment, 
which includes  other  agents or objects.  Obviously,  this environment is much  more  diver- 
35 
5  Automated Safety  Analysis based on Component-oriented  Modeling 	  
	  
	  
	  
Driving	   Situations	  	   Road	  Conditions	  	   Spatial	  
Configurations	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Environment Conditions 
	  
	  	  	   	   	   	  	   ti	  	   	   	  	   	  ti	  	   	  
C	  	  	  	  	  fig	  	  	  	  	  	   ti	  
	  
	  
	  
Fault	  	   Hazard	  	   Impact	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Figure 5.2: Core elements of automated hazard and impact analysis 
	  
	  
sified and  dynamically  changing compared to the  designed artifact,  the  vehicle.   It cannot 
be  explored  exhaustively, but only through  certain  abstract types  of scenarios and  driving 
situation. 
	  
In consequence, we approach the  task  of building a tool for safety  analysis by dividing it 
(conceptually) into two steps (Figure 5.2): 
	  
hazard  analysis: a model  of the vehicle is used to determine whether  assumed faults 
of (software  or physical)  components may  result  in (pre-defined) hazards for a set  of 
specified  driving conditions  (in terms  of speed, driver actions, etc.)  and  road  condition 
(road surface, slope). 
	  
impact  analysis: a model  of the  environment, which includes  the  vehicle  as  well as 
other objects and agents, determines whether  the hazard may have a dangerous impact 
(in our case, a collision) under  certain environment conditions, which include the driving 
and road conditions  (e. g., curves) and the spatial  configuration  of other objects. 
	  
The two models  together, associate component faults with their impacts, i.e., safety violations 
and  risks.  Based on the composed model,  the automated analysis (Figure 5.2) can  be car- 
ried out in one step,  directly relating component faults and impacts, without the intermediate 
effects,  the hazards. 
	  
We mention that, based on the above statements, we currently exclude  two relevant  aspects: 
Firstly, software  faults may indirectly create a safety  critical situation,  e. g., by supplying  the 
driver with wrong,  too  little, or too  much  information  and,  thus,  causing an  inappropriate 
driver action.  Secondly, we do not consider the physical  impact of hazards on the driver and 
passengers of the vehicle. 
	  
Finally, we derive  some  design  decisions from requirements and  the inherent  nature  of the 
task.   As emphasized before,  the  analysis is highly repetitive,  demanding, and  has  to be 
performed several times  during the design  phase, applied  to alternative designs, and  sub- 
sequently to different  versions and  variants.  This does not necessarily  make  the  manual 
analysis more  reliable  but more  error prone.   Any proposed solution  to supporting the pro- 
cess will only be economically beneficial if it does not multiply efforts along with the repetition, 
as  well. More specifically,  if for each analysis, a model  of the respective subsystem variant 
has  to be built from scratch, this is unlikely to be superior  to a manual analysis. The answer 
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to this challenge lies in the reuse of models, i. e., compositional modeling, where  system 
models  are composed from component models  in a library. 
	  
The nature  of the analysis makes compositional modeling  feasible:  it is an inherently  qual- 
itative and a worst-case analysis.  Firstly, the analysis is performed at design  time, and 
parameters may not yet have  numerical  values. Beyond  this, the faults are  qualitative:  de- 
creased friction of a brake,  a leakage of a pipe, a high sensor signal etc.  cannot  be described 
by numerical  values, but only by ranges of them.  Hazards are qualitative:  too high or too low 
acceleration, and best  specified  at this level of granularity.  Environment conditions  are qual- 
itative: “a vehicle approaching a pedestrian crossing with medium  speed”  or “going downhill 
a winding road”.  With regard to the required inferences, the worst-case analysis is not ex- 
pected (and, given the qualitative input, not able) to firmly conclude the impact.  What needs 
to be determined is the potential of a collision, e.g.  given a reduced deceleration of the ve- 
hicle and,  hence, a longer brake  path  – considering that it is uncertain whether  pedestrians 
are  present or not.  Nevertheless, determining that  a brake  with reduced friction results  in 
a reduced deceleration suffices  to consider it as  a reason for a risk in the  respective sce- 
nario. 
	  
Hence, we need qualitative models  and representations and inferences determining the pos- 
sibility of hazards and  severe impacts. At this point, we note  that  the  qualitative  nature  of 
the required  models  provides  the basis  for reusable models  and cheap model building. The 
impact on the level of abstraction of the models  will be shown  in the following sections. 
	  
	  
	  
5.3  A Formalism for Qualitative Deviation Models 
	  
	  
As motivated  by the discussion above (Section  5.2), the characteristics of the models  used 
in our solution are the following: 
	  
Compositional modeling:  models  of systems are obtained through aggregation of mod- 
els of its parts,  possibly  across several layers  of hierarchy. 
	  
Component-oriented modeling:   the  parts  are  components, i.e.   the  building  blocks 
that are  assembled to form the system and  determine its behavior  (both physical  and 
software  components).  This  is due  to two reasons.  Firstly,  component models  can 
be  reused in different  system models  just as  the  components are  reused in different 
systems. Secondly, components are the entities that are subject to faults, whose impact 
needs to be determined in safety  analysis. 
	  
Qualitative  behavior  models  reflect the nature  of the analysis, as pointed  out above. 
	  
Relational models  (as opposed to functions or transition  systems) are chosen to repre- 
sent  these qualitative behavior  descriptions, based on the observation that hazards are 
commonly the result of a fault in one state of the physical  system (rather  than occurring 
after a sequence of state transitions). 
	  
Deviation models  are  used, since  faults,  hazards, and  impact  are  characterized as 
(qualitatively) distinct from nominal behavior. 
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In the  following,  we  specify  these characteristics more  formally,  though  in a  nutshell  (for 
introductory material,  see [Str97, Str00, SP03, HdKC92, Str08]). 
	  
	  
	  
Component-oriented Modeling     A component type (used to create different instances) is 
represented under  a structural  and a behavioral perspective: 
	  
It has  a number of typed terminals, which can be shared with other components. 
	  
Thus, a system structure is described as (C OM P S, C ON N EC T I ON S), where  C OM P S 
is a set of (typed) components and C ON N EC T I ON S is a set of pairs of terminals  of equal 
type belonging  to different components. 
	  
A component Ci has  a vector vPi  = (vik ) of variables, comprising  parameters and 
state  variables, which are  considered as  internal  and  constant and  dynamically 
changing, resp.,  and  terminal  variables.  The latter are  obtained as  instances of 
terminal types  which have  a set of associated variable  types. 
	  
The C ON N EC T I ON S of a system structure induce a set V ARI ABLEC ON N EC T I ON S 
of pairs of corresponding terminal variables from connected components.  Each  variable 
connection introduces a  mapping  between the  values of the  connected variables:  this  is 
usually  equality  (for signals, voltage  etc.),  while for directed  variables, such  as  torque  and 
current,  the sign is flipped. 
A component Ci has a set of behavior modes {modej (Ci )}, where one mode,  OK , 
corresponds to the nominal behavior  of the component and the other ones denote 
different defects of the component. 
	  
	  
	  
Qualitative  Modeling     Qualitative  models  describe component behavior  in terms  of vari- 
able  domains DOM (vik ) that  are  finite.  Besides domains that  are  considered “naturally” 
discrete, such  as  Boolean  for binary  signals and  {OP EN, C LOSED}   for the  state of a 
clutch,  the  domains of continuous variables are  obtained by discretization and  are  usually 
finite set  of intervals that reflect the essential distinctions  needed for capturing  the relevant 
aspects of component behavior: 
	  
DOM (vik ) = {Iikm |m = 1, 2, . . . , n}. 
	  
	  
	  
Relational Modeling     The  behavior  of a  component under  a  particular  behavior  mode, 
modej (Ci ), is represented as  the  set  of qualitative  tuples  that  are  possible if this mode  is 
present, i. e., as a relation 
	  
Rij ⊂  DOM (vPi ) = DOM (vi1 ) ×  DOM (vi2 ) ×  ·∙  ·∙  ·∙  ×  DOM (vir ), 
	  
or, in AI terminology,  as a constraint (which means many operations on models  introduced 
in the following can be realized  using techniques of Finite Constraint Satisfaction). Each vari- 
able connection (vp , vq ) introduces a connection relation Rpq  capturing  the mapping  between 
domains. 
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Compositional Modeling     A model  of an aggregate system is not unique,  but dependent 
on the behavior  modes of the components. A mode  assignment M A = {modej (Ci )}  spec- 
ifies a unique  behavior  mode  for each component, and  a model of the system is obtained 
as  the (natural)  join (as  in the relational  algebra and  SQL, see [Cod70]) of the mode  model 
relations  and the connection relations: 
	  
RM A = (   Rpq )     (   Rij ) (5.1) 
	  
	  
	  
	  
Deviation Models     Some  faults are  stated in absolute terms  (“zero braking torque  exerted 
by brake”),  while others  are  only described in relative  terms  (“reduced  braking  torque  pro- 
duced by a worn brake”), and so are definitions of hazards: “reduced  deceleration of vehicle”. 
Such  models  are meant  to capture qualitative deviations from the nominal behavior, which is 
the basis  for detecting deviations in the behavior  of the entire system. We use deviation mod- 
els in the same way as  [Str04], [SF12a]:  the qualitative  deviation  of a variable  x is defined 
as 
∆x := sign(xact ­−  xnom ), (5.2) 
	  
which captures whether  an actual  (observed, assumed, or inferred) value is greater, less  or 
equal  to the nominal  value.  The latter is the value  to be expected under  nominal  behavior, 
technically:  the value resulting  when all components are  in OK mode.  Qualitative  deviation 
models  can  be obtained from standard models  stated in terms  of (differential) equations by 
canonical transformations, such  as 
	  
a + b = c ⇒  ∆a ⊕  ∆b = ∆c 
	  
a ∗  b = c ⇒  (aact  ⊗  ∆b) ⊕  (bact  ⊗  ∆a) 8  (∆a ⊗  ∆b) = ∆c. 
Here,  ⊕, ⊗, 8   are  addition,  multiplication,  and  subtraction operators of interval  arithmetic 
applied  to signs  represented as (­−∞, 0), [0, 0], (0, ∞). 
	  
	  
	  
	  
5.4  Automated Prediction of Effects 
	  
	  
	  
From a logical point of view, the two steps in the process of Figure 5.2 are similar: 
	  
Hazard analysis requires checking  whether  a hazard is, or may be, caused by an as- 
sumed fault under  given driving conditions. Logically, this means determining whether 
the hazard is implied by or, at least consistent with, the model  of the faulty vehicle 
(with the respective fault model included) and information about the driving situation and 
road condition. 
	  
Impact analysis requires the same check  for the impact:  is it implied  by or, at least 
consistent with, the model  of the faulty vehicle and information about the environ- 
ment conditions. 
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Figure 5.3: A relational  perspective on determining effects  based on fault modes and  sce- 
narios  Sk 
	  
	  
Actually,  hazard analysis is  equivalent to  FMEA restricted to  system-level effects,   since 
FMEA analyzes whether  or not a component fault leads to a predefined effect (which is a 
violation of the intended functionality and  safety)  under  a certain  scenario (mission  or mis- 
sion phase). This is why, for both hazard analysis and the overall impact analysis, we exploit 
an  algorithm  that  has  been used for FMEA [PCB+ 04, SF12a].  The  algorithm  is based on 
representing not only behavior  models  as  finite relations  (as  described in Section  5.3), but 
also  effects  and  scenarios. Effects  can  naturally  be stated as  relations  Ej on system vari- 
ables that characterize the relevant  aspects of system behavior, such as (the deviation of) the 
acceleration of a vehicle,  while a scenario is typically a relation  Sk   on exogenous variables 
and internal states of the system like the position of the brake  pedal  (pushed or not) and the 
vehicle speed. The algorithm checks the presence of effects  for each possible single fault in 
the system under each defined scenario. Using the relational representation, this means that 
for a mode assignment M Ai that contains exactly one fault mode and OK modes otherwise, 
the respective behavior  model  RM Ai  is automatically composed according to Equation  5.1. 
Then,  for each scenario Sk  and each effect Ej , it is determined whether 
	  
πj (RM Ai       Sk ) ⊆  Ej , 
where  πj denotes the projection (as used in relational  algebra [Cod70]) to the variables 
of Ej .  The positive  case, i. e.,  the faulty behavior  is included  in the effect,  means that 
the effect will definitely occur (case E1  in Figure 5.3).  Stated in logic, this means that 
the fault entails  the effect in this scenario. 
	  
πj (RM Ai Sk ) ∩  Ej = ∅. 
If the intersection is empty,  the effect does not occur  (case E2 ). Logically, the effect is 
inconsistent with the fault mode  and the scenario. 
	  
Otherwise, the effect possibly occurs (case E3),  i. e.,  RM Ai        Sk   covers both condi- 
tions under  which the effect is present and  others  under  which it does not occur  – the 
effect is consistent with the fault mode  and the scenario. 
	  
Figure 5.3 also  indicates that all effects  should  be disjoint from πj (ROK       Sk ), where  ROK 
is the model  for the mode  assignment of OK to all components.  If this is not fulfilled, this 
would indicate a design  fault or an improper effect definition (because the correct device may 
violate the requirements) – or, of course, a modeling  bug. 
5.3  A Formalism for Qualitative  Deviation Models 
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Figure 5.4: Automatic generation of a specific FMEA analysis by automated model composi- 
tion and application  of a generic inference engine. 
	  
	  
The  model  based systems tool Raz’r [OCC95] includes  an implementation of an algorithm 
that  performs  the  checks specified  above for each scenario and  fault  and  generates the 
FMEA table.   Exploiting compositional modeling,  also  the  generation of the  model  of the 
(faulty) system is automatic, such  that an FMEA tailored to a specific device  requires solely 
a description of the device  structure as an input, as indicated  in Figure 5.4. 
	  
We will employ the algorithm in three  ways, namely  for deriving 
	  
Hazards from fault modes, where  the fault modes are components faults, and scenar- 
ios are the driving situations and road conditions  (Section  5.5) 
	  
Impacts  from hazards, using the hazards as the fault modes and specifying scenarios 
as environment conditions  (Section  5.6) 
	  
Impacts  from fault modes, which are  component faults and  analyzed under  different 
environment conditions  (Section  5.6.4). 
	  
	  
	  
	  
5.5  Case Study: Model-based Hazard Analysis 
	  
	  
	  
Based on Section  2, this section gives  details  on the  modeling  of each component of the 
case study  and  applies part of the reasoning procedure explained above.  Throughout this 
section, most  variables have  values from the  domain  Sign  = {­−, 0, +}:  torques (T) and 
forces (F), rotational  and  translational speeds (ω and  v) and  translational acceleration a , ω 
and  v, together with their deviations, in which case the ∆ symbol precedes the above men- 
tioned  variables. The commands and  states explicitly discussed here  have  Boolean  values 
{0, 1}. 
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5.5.1  Modeling  the Drive Train 
	  
	  
The core purpose of the drive train component models  is to determine the (deviation  of the) 
torque  acting  on the wheels, which determines the (deviation  of the) translational accelera- 
tion of the vehicle (if the road surface permits). 
	  
Faults  may introduce non-zero deviations, e.g.   the model  of a worn brake  would generate 
a  deviating  braking  torque,  which depends on  the  direction  of a  non-zero rotation  (static 
friction) 
∆Tbrake = ω (5.3) 
	  
or in the direction of the applied  torque  in case of kinetic friction 
∆Tbrake = Twheel  (5.4) 
Models  of both,  OK behavior  and  faulty behavior, are  stated in terms  of constraints (i. e., 
relations) on  the  deviations.  For instance, a  closed clutch  propagates a  deviating  torque 
arriving on the left (i. e., of the engine)  further to the right (under  a change of the sign): 
	  
∆Tright  = ­−∆Tleft. (5.5) 
	  
	  
	  
	  
The overall torque  is not determined locally, but results  from the interaction  of all mechan- 
ical components.  The  engine  can  produce a driving torque,  the  braking  elements (wheel 
brake,  retarder, engine)  may generate a torque  opposite to the rotation,  and  the clutch and 
transmission may interrupt or reverse the propagated torque. 
	  
Our current  model  is based on assuming that there  are  no cyclic structures among  the me- 
chanically  connected components, which is the  case in our application, but certainly  also 
in a much  broader class of systems.  The  component models  link the  torque  (deviations) 
on the right-hand  side  to the one  on the left-hand  side,  possibly  adding  a torque  (deviation) 
generated by the  respective component.  Hence, at each location  in the  drive-train  model, 
the torque  represents the sum of all torques collected  left of it, and so does the torque  devi- 
ation. 
	  
Whenever a  component terminates the  torque  propagation (e. g.,  the  wheel  or an  open 
clutch),  the  arriving torque  is also  the  total one  for the  section left.  For an  open  compo- 
nent, the torque  on the right-hand  side is zero, as exemplified by the clutch (state  = 0 means 
open): 
state  = 1 ⇒  Tright = Tleft (5.6) 
state  = 0   ⇒    Ttotal  = Tleft    ∧     Tright = 0                                    (5.7) 
Determining  the  deviation  models  is not  as  straightforward as  it may  appear, as  we  will 
explain using the model of the retarder as an example. If engaged (state  = 1), it will generate 
a torque  Tbrake  opposite to the rotation (zero, if there  is no rotation) and add it to the left-hand 
one.  The base model is obvious: 
	  
Tright = Tleft ⊕  Tbrake  (5.8) 
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cmd ∆cmd ∆state 
1 0 0 
0 0 + 
0 - 0 
1 + + 
	  
Table 5.1:  Retarder stuck engaged - Deviation constraint 
	  
	  
state  = 1 ⇒  Tbrake  = ­−ω (5.9) 
state  = 0 ⇒  Tbrake  = 0 (5.10) 
where  ⊕  denotes addition  of signs.   The first line directly translates into a constraint on the 
deviations: 
∆Tright  = ∆Tleft ⊕  ∆Tbrake  (5.11) 
However,  determining ∆Tbrake  requires consideration of how the actual  state is related  to the 
nominal one,  which depends on the control command to the component, and,  to complicate 
matters, not on the  actual  command, but the  command that corresponds to the  nomi- 
nal state. This means we have  to model  possibly  deviating  commands, and  we apply the 
concept and definition of a deviation  also  to Boolean  variables. For instance, in the retarder 
model,  ∆state = ­−  means state  = 0 (i. e.,  it is not engaged) although  it should  be  1, and 
∆state = + expresses that it is erroneously engaged. Such  deviations could be caused by 
retarder faults, e.g.  stuck-engaged. However,  in the context  of our analysis, we must  con- 
sider the possibility that the commands to the retarder are not the nominal ones (caused by 
a software  fault or the response of the correct  software  to a deviating  sensor value).  Under 
multiple faults, a component fault may even  mask  the  effect of a wrong command (the  re- 
tarder  stuck  engaged compensates for ∆cmd = ­−).  In the  OK model  of the  retarder, the 
component does what the command requests and the deviations of the command and state 
(i. e., the real, physical  state) are identical: 
∆state = ∆cmd (5.12) 
Table  5.1  captures the  constraint on the  deviations for a fault  “stuck engaged”.  Here,  the 
third row represents the  masking case  mentioned above, while the  first row reflects  that 
the physical  state coincides with the command, while in the second row, it does not.  From 
∆state, ∆brake is determined by 
	  
∆Tbrake = ­−ω ⊗  ∆state  (5.13) 
where  ⊗  denotes multiplication of signs.  This completes the model of the retarder. 
	  
	  
5.5.2  Software Models 
	  
	  
Since  the  drive train contains a number of ECUs,  we also  need to include  models  of soft- 
ware  in our library.  More specifically,  we also  have  to include  models  of software  faults.  In 
principle, the space of software  faults is infinite and  enumerating and  modeling  faults in our 
context  may seem infeasible. However,  the fault models  we need do not have  to capture a 
5.5  Case Study:  Model-based Hazard Analysis 
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detailed  description of what can  be bugs  in the ECU software  (missing  termination  criteria, 
wrong thresholds, omitted statements, etc.), which would lead to a huge  set of fault models. 
Remember:  all that  matters about  software  faults  is their impact  on the  physical  system, 
more  precisely, on the controlled  actuators. For the Boolean  commands in our model,  this 
means the only fault types  to be considered are 
Missing (or late) command: ∆cmd = ­−  
	  
Untimely (or early) command: ∆cmd = +. 
	  
The same applies to continuous actuator signals, where  the faults represent “signal too low” 
and “signal too high”, respectively. This illustrates  our claim that putting safety  analysis back 
on its feet and the physical model in the center, greatly simplifies the modeling and analysis of 
the embedded software. In particular,  for the purpose of hazard analysis, we obtain a small 
set  of reusable software  models  for our library.  Of course, if we do have  a more  detailed 
model of the software, also the fault models  can be more specific. 
	  
	  
	  
5.5.3  The Model Library 
	  
	  
Along these lines,  a library of component type models  has  been produced that covers the 
basic  mechanical components of the drive train and the related  ECUs: 
	  
Engine 
	  
Crankshaft 
	  
Clutch 
	  
Gear  box 
	  
Retarder 
	  
Wheel 
	  
Wheel brake 
	  
Engine  ECU 
	  
Transmission ECU (controlling the gear  box and the clutch) 
	  
Retarder ECU 
	  
Brake ECU 
	  
Furthermore, there  are  some  special components, whose interaction  with the other  compo- 
nents contributes to the behavior  of the entire system: 
	  
Load, a virtual “component”  that represents the mass of the entire  truck.  It contributes 
to determining the gravitational force and transforms the force acting on it to acceleration 
	  
Road, whose friction influences how translational forces and velocities relate  to torques 
and rotational  speeds and whose slope  determines the gravitational  force 
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Figure 5.5: Vehicle model (Screenshot from Raz’r [OCC95]) 
	  
	  
Driver, creating  driving conditions  by pushing  the  accelerator or the  brake  pedal,  se- 
lecting gears, etc. 
	  
Vehicle, the  entire  system, capturing  the  behavior  (deviation)  of the  truck,  currently 
solely the speed and  acceleration deviation,  but in future extensions also  the steering 
angle  (deviation).  Therefore, it represents the link to the environment model,  as  will be 
shown  later. 
	  
From this library, the vehicle model is generated automatically in Raz’r [OCC95] from a struc- 
tural system description, which is constructed by drag  and  drop  in a CAD-like manner, as 
depicted in Figure 5.5. 
	  
	  
	  
5.5.4  Driving Situations and Road Conditions 
	  
	  
The vehicle model  (Figure 5.5) is used to predict  the potential  misbehavior of the vehicle in 
the  presence of different component faults and  under  different conditions.  As indicated  in 
Figure 5.2, we split these conditions  into 
	  
driving situation,  which characterizes the state of the vehicle 
	  
road  condition,  i. e.,  state variables friction and  slope  of the  “component”  Road  intro- 
duced above. 
	  
The list of driving situations (see Table  5.2) we consider is a set  of common  plausible  and 
technically  feasible  combinations of driver inputs  to the  vehicle  and  the  speed.  For in- 
stance, the accelerator implies the respective signal to the engine  ECU. The basic  situations 
are:  starting,  driving, and  braking  in both forward and  backward direction.  For driving and 
braking in forward direction,  we distinguish  between two orders  of magnitude of speed, low 
(+) and high (++). This distinction is actually not relevant  to determining deviations in accel- 
eration,  but influences the impact analysis, because it results, for instance, in different brake 
distances. 
	  
Implausible  combinations like pushing  accelerator and  brake  pedal  at  the  same time  are 
omitted here  (although  the model  covers this condition).  Some  plausible  ones are  currently 
not included,  such  as  pushing  the brake  pedal  at speed zero.  This is of interest  when stop- 
ping on a slope  which we have  not considered in this report. 
5.5  Case Study:  Model-based Hazard Analysis 
45 
	  
	  
	  
	  
Driving situation Accelerator 
pushed 
Brake pedal 
pushed 
Chosen gear Clutch pedal 
not pushed 
v 
F N R 
R-accelerate x 	   	   	   x X - 
R-start x 	   	   	   x X 0 
F-start x 	   x 	   	   X 0 
Drive high speed x 	   x 	   	   X ++ 
Drive low speed x 	   x 	   	   X + 
R-brake 	   x 	   	   X X - 
Stop 	   x X 	   	   X 0 
F-brake high speed 	   x X 	   	   (X) ++ 
F-brake low speed 	   x X 	   	   (X) + 
	  
Table 5.2: Definition of driving situations 
	  
increased deceleration a 
backward  + 
	  
deceleration acceleration 
	  
∆a = + 
	  
x 
	  
backward motion forward motion 
	  
- 
x  nominal 
deviating 
	  
+ ++ v 
	  
	  
acceleration deceleration 
	  
- 
	  
	  
Figure 5.6: Qualitative modeling:  location of nominal and deviating accelerations exemplified 
for one hazard and one driving situation  (ID 13 in Table 5.3) 
	  
	  
	  
The  road  conditions  in terms  of surface friction and  slope  have,  so  far,  been fixed to + 
(sufficient friction for preventing sliding or free spinning of the wheel) and 0 (horizontal road), 
although  the models  include the other cases. 
	  
	  
	  
5.5.5  Hazard Definition 
	  
	  
The hazards (corresponding to effects  in FMEA) are  given by deviating accelerations act- 
ing on the vehicle,  ∆a ∈  {­−, +}.  Hence, basically,  there  are  only two hazards, reduced or 
increased acceleration (relative to forward direction).  However,  an intuitive physical  interpre- 
tation reflects  various  driving situations with different (intended) directions  of the motion/ac- 
celeration. For instance, ∆a = + in forward driving means increased acceleration and higher 
speed than  intended; but for braking in backward motion (i. e., velocity v = ­−, acceleration 
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before before 
a (acceleration, deceleration) 
+ 
	  
	  
before 
∆a = + 
	  
x 
	  
	  
- 
	  
	  
x  nominal 
deviating 
	  
	  
x 
	  
	  
v = 0 a = 
0 
deviating 
	  
v ≠ 0 
a ≠ 0 
	  
	  
	  
	  
next 
	  
+ 
	  
	  
	  
	  
next next 
v (motion) 
v = 0 
- a = 0 
nominal 
x 
	  
t (temporal situation) 
	  
Figure 5.7: Location of nominal  and  deviating  accelerations exemplified  for one  hazard and 
one driving situation  (ID 13 in Table 5.3) in the qualitative time domain 
	  
	  
	  
a = + and  ∆a = +) it states that the vehicle decelerates faster.  See Figure 5.6, where  this 
case is located  in the top left quadrant. Hence, for presenting the results  of hazard analysis, 
we introduce condition-dependent hazards according to Table 5.3 which extends and refines 
Table  2.1.   The  first and  the  last  row in this table  correspond to the  two cases discussed 
above. 
	  
Figure  5.6 locates the  nominal  and  deviating  accelerations of the  vehicle.   Based on that, 
Figure 5.7 shows two possible evolutions using a qualitative  time domain  consisting of five 
temporal situations t = {before-before, before,  now, next,  next-next }: For increased deceler- 
ation (deviating  acceleration), v = 0 already  at time t = next,  and  for nominal  deceleration 
(nominal acceleration), v = 0 not until time t = next-next. The diagram  represents the case 
of a simplified linear physical  motion over qualitative  time.  In a quantitative physical  setting, 
we would have  a vector  equation of the form Pv(t + 1) = Pv(t) + Pa(t) + ∆Pa(t) to capture the 
physical  situation  more precisely. 
	  
	  
	  
5.5.6  Results of Hazard Analysis 
	  
	  
Hazard  analysis was carried  out using Raz’r’s FMEA engine  with the above specified  driving 
situations (plus  friction and  slope  fixed) as  scenarios and  the  hazards as  defined  in Sec- 
tions 5.5.4 and 5.5.5.  In the Figures  5.8, 5.9 and 5.10, some  of the automatically generated 
tables for the situations “F-start,  F-brake, Drive” with forward motion are  shown  (where  the 
distinction between high and low speed does not matter  and is omitted).  The uncolored rows 
are  hazards that are  definite, i. e., logically entailed  by the respective fault and  driving situ- 
ation, while the highlighted rows indicate  possible hazards (logically: consistent with fault 
and driving situation),  according to the cases discussed in Section  5.4. 
	  
In the driving situation  “Drive” (Figure 5.10), a retarder stuck  in engaged position may over- 
come  the accelerating torque  (”unintended deceleration”) or only diminish this quantity (”re- 
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ID Hazard Driving Situation a ∆a 
1 Increased acceleration Drive, 
F-start 
+ + 
2 Reduced or no acceleration Drive, 
F-start 
+, 0 - 
3 Unintended deceleration Drive - - 
4 Unintended backward acceleration F-start, 
R-brake 
- - 
5 Reduced or no deceleration F-brake -, 0 + 
6 Increased deceleration F-brake - - 
7 Unintended acceleration F-brake + + 
8 Increased backward acceleration R-accelerate, 
R-start 
- - 
9 Reduced or no backward acceleration R-accelerate, 
R-start 
-, 0 + 
10 Unintended deceleration backward R-accelerate + + 
11 Unintended forward acceleration ID3) R-start + + 
12 Reduced or no deceleration backward R-brake +, 0 - 
13 Increased deceleration backward R-brake + + 
	  
Table 5.3: Definition of hazards, multiple values in a cell indicate  a disjunction,  extends and 
refines  Table 2.1 
	  
	  
	  
 
	  
	  
Figure 5.8: Hazard  analysis for the driving situation  ”F-start” 
	  
	  
	  
	  
duced or no  acceleration”).  Both cases are  actually  possible, and  the  qualitative  models 
correctly  produce this ambiguous result.  As a less  obvious  result,  the clutch stuck  open  in 
the driving situation  “F-brake” (Figure 5.9) triggers  ”Reduced or no deceleration”, because  it 
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Figure 5.9: Hazard  analysis for the driving situation  ”F-brake” 
	  
	  
	  
prevents the engine  from contributing to the braking torque. 
	  
An evaluation of the  results  yields  that,  for the  faults  modeled and  the  considered driving 
situations, the tables contain  no false positives  and false negatives. 
5.5  Case Study:  Model-based Hazard Analysis 
49 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
	  
	  
Figure 5.10: Hazard  analysis for the driving situation  ”Drive” 
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5.6  Case Study: Model-based Impact  Analysis 
	  
	  
The hazard analysis described above yields the consequences of faults in terms of deviations 
in the motion of the vehicle, more specifically, deviations of its acceleration. These deviations 
may be influenced  by the friction and  slope  of the road,  but are,  otherwise, independent of 
interactions with other  objects in the  environment.  In other  words,  they lie at the  interface 
between the vehicle and its environment. 
	  
Determining  the impact  of this deviation  on the environment requires a representation that 
can express the location and motion of the vehicle as well as other objects in this environment 
as  a basis  for inferring the potential  of collisions.   As before,  this analysis is carried  out for 
different scenarios, where scenarios in this phase are seen as different spatial configurations 
of the vehicle and other objects (see Figure 5.2).  Besides their (potential) spatial  extension, 
objects have  an associated type (which influences the severity  of the impact). 
	  
As we saw  above, hazards are  qualitative,  and  so are  the different spatial  configurations in 
the environment, which represent classes of specific real situations, such as “street with peo- 
ple on the sidewalk” and  “approaching exit on a freeway”.  As a consequence, the required 
spatial  representation has  to be very abstract and  qualitative,  as  described in the following 
section. 
	  
	  
5.6.1  Spatial  Representation 
	  
	  
As opposed to other work that exploits spatial  reasoning for exploring trajectories of moving 
objects and  their  spatial  relations  and  predicting  collisions  based on  particular  situations 
(e. g., [WDFN07]), we need to represent archetypes of situations, possible ranges of motions, 
and the potential  of collisions. 
	  
To approach this and  derive  a simplified representation, we first abstract from the  road  as 
a 3D object:  Although it may  go uphill and  downhill, the  3rd dimension is eliminated  and 
only expressed as an attribute  slope of the road,  which influences the motion of the vehicle 
through  gravitational  force, which is already  covered by the vehicle model. 
	  
Secondly, we ”rectify” the possibly  winding trajectory:  Although the road (or, more generally, 
the intended trajectory  of the vehicle, as in ”exiting from a freeway”) may have  curves, which 
influences the impact  (e. g., at high speeds), we also  turn this into a (Boolean)  attribute  of 
the  road,  indicating  whether  the  curvature  is significant  or not,  and  transform  the  space 
by turning  the  vehicle  trajectory  into one  coordinate axis,  σ,  and  the  orthogonal distance 
from the road  the other  coordinate, δ, with the initial location  of the vehicle  in the origin, as 
illustrated  by Figure 5.11. 
	  
Next, we abstract this space according to the distinctions  that appeared in the natural  lan- 
guage scenario descriptions supplied by the industrial partner, i.e. we discretize R2 to a level 
that  captures the  qualitative  distinctions  needed to characterize locations  and  that  is able 
to infer a potential  collision due  to the (qualitatively) deviating  motion of the vehicle.  As an 
initial solution  we chose the grid depicted in Figure  5.12.  The grid is defined  by qualitative 
positions  0 (at the vehicle), close, medium,  far (both in front of and behind  the vehicle) for σ, 
i. e., along the vehicle trajectory,  and straight, right-of, medium-right-of,  far-right-of (and the 
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Figure 5.11: Rectifying the road 
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Figure 5.12: The qualitative spatial  representation 
	  
	  
same for left) for δ, the distance from the trajectory.  The vehicle’s initial position  will always 
be  in (0, s),  while pedestrians may  cover  the  r-strip, or a median  be  located  in the  l-strip. 
Figure 5.13 depicts how different spatial  configurations are represented using this grid (note 
that curves  are not visible in the graphical  representation). 
	  
	  
	  
	  
5.6.2  Model for Impact Analysis 
	  
	  
The concept behind  the environment model  is to map  hazards (expressed as  deviations of 
acceleration and, in future extensions, steering deviations) to potential regions  of impact and 
to determine the impact  in terms  of potential collisions.  Since  a collision means that two 
objects are in the same location, potential  collisions are obtained as non-empty intersection 
of impact  ranges of the vehicle  and  other  objects, where  the impact  range  of the vehicle  is 
the  set  of the  potential  locations  after  the  initial situation.   The  impact  range  is influenced 
by the driving situation  (direction and magnitude of speed, accelerating or decelerating), the 
curvature of the road,  and  the presence of hazards, i. e., deviations in acceleration). At this 
time,  we ignore  the  influence  of another factor,  the  mass of the  vehicle,  which may  vary, 
especially for trucks. 
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Figure 5.13: Overview of spatial  configurations 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Figure 5.14: The spatial  reasoning components. For each reasoning step,  only one element 
from the right, which represents a spatial  configuration,  is connected to form a 
specific spatial  configuration  as part of a scenario. 
	  
	  
As shown  in Figure  5.14  (a screen shot  from Raz’r), the model  that produces the required 
inferences comprises 
	  
the vehicle, 
	  
the road, 
	  
another object   (which  can  represent an  aggregation of individual  objects,  such  as 
pedestrians or buildings), and 
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the  environment as  the  central  ”component”  that  performs  the  essential part  of the 
collision analysis. 
	  
The  environment model  is fairly straightforward:  it has  only an OK model, which has  the 
task of determining the impact  range  of the vehicle from 
	  
the speed of the vehicle, 
	  
its acceleration deviation, 
	  
a deviation of the steering angle  (which is not within the scope of the modeled part of 
the system) and 
	  
the curvature  of the road, 
	  
	  
which is expressed in one  impact range  constraint. In our current  vehicle model,  deviations 
in steering do not occur,  but the impact  of a positive  deviation  and  a high speed may lead 
the vehicle away from s-locations if the road has  a significant curvature. The basis  for this is 
the introduction of the distinction between low and high speed. 
	  
The  impact  has  to be  defined  as  the  system level effect  (which is the  local  effect of the 
environment component) in this step of the analysis. Since the relevant  impact is a potential 
collision, which means the impact range  of the vehicle and the set of potential object locations 
have  a non-empty intersection, these collision effects  simply contain  a constraint 
	  
Equal(vehicle.impactrange, object.location), (5.14) 
	  
	  
which is satisfied  unless the sets of possible values are a disjoint. As a basis  for the assess- 
ment  of severity,  especially when  persons are  affected, the type of the object  is important, 
and  we define an impact “injured-persons” by adding  the constraint Equal (object.type, per- 
sons). 
	  
Impact  analysis is then  carried  out again  by applying  the  FMEA engine  to a  list of faults 
and  a set  of environment conditions  to determine whether  or not one  of the collision effects 
are  consistent.  Note  that  the  collision occurs  as  a definite  effect  if and  only if the  impact 
range  and  the  potential  object  locations  are  the  same singleton. Based on the  introduced 
models, we have  performed two variants of impact  analysis, as  discussed in chapter 5.4: 
determining 
	  
impacts from hazards, using the hazards as the fault modes and specifying scenarios 
as environment conditions 
	  
impacts from fault modes, which are  component faults and  analyzed under  different 
environment conditions. 
	  
We present the results  in the next two sections. 
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Name	  
Driving	  
Situation	  
	  
Road	  
Spatial	  
Configuration	  
	  
Part	  
Failure	  
Mode	  
	  
Hazard	  /	  Impact	  
Pedestrian	  
crossing	  
medium,	  low	  
speed	  
	  
Low	  
Speed	  
	  
No	  
curves	  
Pedestrian	  
Crossing	  
Medium	  
Vehicle	   deltaaminus	   :>>no	  system	  level	  effects<<	  
	  
Vehicle	  
	  
deltaaplus	  
	  
:Injury_Person	  
Pedestrian	  
crossing	  far,	  
high	  speed	  
High	  
Speed	  
No	  
Curves	  
Pedestrian	  
Crossing	  Far	  
Vehicle	   deltaaminus	   :>>no	  system	  level	  effects<<	  
Vehicle	   deltaaplus	   :Injury_Person	  
Pedestrian	  
crossing	  far,	  
low	  speed	  
Low	  
Speed	  
No	  
Curves	  
Pedestrian	  
Crossing	  Far	  
Vehicle	   deltaaminus	   :>>no	  system	  level	  effects<<	  
Vehicle	   deltaaplus	   :>>no	  system	  level	  effects<<	  
Person	  on	  the	  
side	  walk,	  high	  
speed	  
High	  
Speed	  
	  
Curves	  
Person	  On	  The	  
Side	  Walk	  
Vehicle	   deltaaminus	   :>>no	  system	  level	  effects<<	  
Vehicle	   deltaaplus	   :Injury_Person	  
Person	  on	  the	  
side	  walk	  
Low	  
Speed	  
No	  
Curves	  
Person	  On	  The	  
Side	  Walk	  
Vehicle	   deltaaminus	   :>>no	  system	  level	  effects<<	  
Vehicle	   deltaaplus	   :>>no	  system	  level	  effects<<	  
Highway	  in	  
city	  
	  
Curves,	  high	  
speed	  
	  
High	  
Speed	  
	  
	  
Curves	  
	  
Buildings	  On	  
The	  Right	  
Vehicle	   deltaaminus	   :>>no	  system	  level	  effects<<	  
	  
	  
Vehicle	  
	  
	  
deltaaplus	  
	  
	  
:collision_with_object	  
Freeway	  exit	  
ahead,	  high	  
speed	  
High	  
Speed	  
	  
Curves	  
Object	  Right	  
Turn	  Far	  
Vehicle	   deltaaminus	   :>>no	  system	  level	  effects<<	  
Vehicle	   deltaaplus	   :collision_with_object	  
Roundabout	  
medium	  
distance	  no	  
traffic,	  low	  
speed	  
	  
	  
Low	  
Speed	  
	  
	  
Curves	  
	  
	  
Object	  Right	  
Turn	  Medium	  
Vehicle	   deltaaminus	   :>>no	  system	  level	  effects<<	  
	  
	  
Vehicle	  
	  
	  
deltaaplus	  
	  
	  
:>>no	  system	  level	  effects<<	  
Freeway	  
approaching	  
tail	  of	  traffic	  
jam,	  high	  
speed	  
	  
	  
High	  
Speed	  
	  
	  
No	  
Curves	  
	  
	  
Vehicle	  Ahead	  
Standing	  Far	  
Vehicle	   deltaaminus	   :>>no	  system	  level	  effects<<	  
	  
	  
Vehicle	  
	  
	  
deltaaplus	  
	  
	  
:collision_with_standing_vehicle	  
	  
	  
Table 5.4: Impact analysis 1, results  from hazards to impacts 
	  
	  
5.6.3  Impact Analysis 1: from Hazards  to Impacts 
	  
	  
This  analysis is based on  the  model  described in the  previous  section.  The  set  of fault 
modes is determined by the vehicle  component and  actually  quite small,  namely  a positive 
and  a negative deviation  of acceleration. The result  of performing  this analysis is shown  in 
Table 5.4. 
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Name	  
Driving	  
Situation	  
Road	  
Spatial	  
Configuration	  
Part	   Failure	  Mode	   Hazard	  /	  Impact	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Freeway	  
exit	  ahead,	  
braking,	  
high	  speed	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Braking,	  
High	  
Speed	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Curves	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Object	  Right	  
Turn	  Far	  
CrankShaft1	   Broken	   :collision_with_object	  
Clutch1	   ClutchStuckOpened	   :collision_with_object	  
	  
Clutch1	  
	  
ClutchStuckClosed	  
:>>no	  system	  level	  
effects<<	  
GearBox1	   StuckReverse	   :collision_with_object	  
GearBox1	   StuckNeutral	   :collision_with_object	  
	  
GearBox1	  
	  
StuckForward	  
:>>no	  system	  level	  
effects<<	  
Retarder1	   RetarderStuckNotEngaged	   :collision_with_object	  
	  
Retarder1	  
	  
RetarderStuckEngaged	  
:>>no	  system	  level	  
effects<<	  
Brakes1	   StuckNotEngaged	   :collision_with_object	  
	  
Brakes1	  
	  
StuckEngaged	  
:>>no	  system	  level	  
effects<<	  
BrakesECU1	   MissingCommand	   :collision_with_object	  
	  
BrakesECU1	  
	  
UntimelyCommand	  
:>>no	  system	  level	  
effects<<	  
RetarderECU1	   MissingCommand	   :collision_with_object	  
	  
RetarderECU1	  
	  
UntimelyCommand	  
:>>no	  system	  level	  
effects<<	  
TransmissionsECU1	   MisingClutchCommand	   :collision_with_object	  
	  
Engine1	  
	  
LowTorque	  
:>>no	  system	  level	  
effects<<	  
	  
Engine1	  
	  
HighTorque	  
:>>no	  system	  level	  
effects<<	  
	  
Table 5.5: Results of the impact analysis for the “freeway exit ahead” environment condition 
	  
	  
5.6.4  Impact Analysis 2: from Component Faults  to Impacts 
	  
	  
The  vehicle  models  shown  in Chapter 2 and  Section  5.5.4  can  be  composed, where  the 
vehicle  and  road  components provide  the  interface.  This  allows  directly determining the 
impact  as  a  result  of the  vehicle  component faults  (the  two vehicle  fault  modes have  to 
be  deleted for this analysis, because they  represent the  effect  of component faults  at the 
vehicle  level).  We present the result  for the environment condition  “Freeway  exit ahead” in 
Table 5.5. 
	  
The most important cases for the complete impact analysis are listed below (see Figure 5.13 
for a visual representation of the cases): 
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Pedestrian crossing medium 
Pedestrian crossing far 
Person on the sidewalk 
Highway in city 
Freeway exit ahead 
	  
Roundabout medium  distance no traffic 
	  
Freeway approaching tail of traffic jam 
	  
	  
	  
5.7  Limitations of the Case Study 
	  
	  
In the analysis presented in Section  5.5 and  5.6, there  is still missing  a representation and 
inferences of an impact on persons and objects inside the vehicle. However,  the modeling 
principles  with its clear  boundaries between the  physical  behavior  of the  vehicle  and  its 
interaction  with the environment and the algorithmic solution apply to this and other kinds of 
impacts  as well, e. g., exposure to heat  or electrical  charges. 
	  
Within the  scope of the  modeled system, the  current  gear  box model  is overly simplified, 
i. e.,  not distinguishing between different  forward  gears.  Moreover,  there  are  more  spatial 
configurations to be included.   The ECU models  could also  be refined  and  analyzed in the 
context  of different ECU architectures.  Furthermore, we did not yet consider impacts  in the 
rear of the vehicle, e. g., unintended braking might cause a subsequent vehicle colliding with 
the one under  analysis. Finally, the influence  of slope  and surface friction of the road on the 
impact is included  in the model but currently not exploited  by the analysis. 
	  
Including more components in the vehicle model,  such  as  electrical  ones, would extend the 
value of the case study.  For instance, a fault in the electrical engine  seen as a generator may 
ultimately affect the function of the steering pump and potentially create possible deviations 
in the  steering angle.   On the  other  hand,  it may  also  turn into an  electric  motor,  adding 
torques to the power  train.  A more  detailed  model  of braking  may also  reveal  an impact  of 
faults that lets the vehicle yaw to one side,  as described in [SF12b]. 
	  
	  
	  
5.8  Summary 
	  
	  
By taking the third perspective, we presented automated safety  analysis based on behavior 
models  of physical and software  components. The approach used is based on compositional 
modeling,  qualitative  deviation  models, and  automated prediction  of effects.   We described 
how we built a model  for the case study  and  illustrated  results  of the reasoning procedure 
consisting of hazard and impact analysis. The case study is a proof of concept that automa- 
tion of the analysis along the lines of Figure 5.2 is feasible. Given the 
	  
component model  library which is not system specific but reusable for a class of sys- 
tems  in a respective domain,  and the 
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spatial  configurations which are  also  reusable but related  to the type of impact to be 
studied, 
	  
the user  of the method  is only required  to supply 
	  
the structural  description which is the essential information about  the system, and 
definitions of hazards if hazard analysis is to be performed. 
These definitions  will be  relevant  to a  whole  class of systems.  Based on  them,  analysis 
results  can be obtained automatically. 
	  
This approach was validated  by creating  models  of the main physical components and ECUs 
of a truck drive train and using them to infer the potential  of hazards from assumed compo- 
nent  faults, where,  due  to the functions  of the system, hazards are  deviations from nominal 
acceleration (and  deceleration). The models  are  generic and  reusable in different contexts 
and for different system structures. In summary, the work provided  a proof of concept. 
	  
Using the same algorithm,  we also  fully automated the analysis of the impact  on the envi- 
ronment, starting  either  from the hazards or again  from component faults (Section  5.1).  In 
the context  of the case study,  the relevant  impacts  are  collisions of the vehicle with persons 
and objects. This analysis requires a coarse-grained spatial  representation and some  basic 
inferences about  the potential  motion of the vehicle relative to the location  of other  objects. 
The developed model is generic, as well, and allows for an easy extension of the set of spa- 
tial configurations of objects. Of course, it is restricted to the class of impacts  that result from 
the motion of the vehicle, which is compliant  with the scope of ISO 26262. 
	  
Under the qualitative and worst-case perspective required  by safety analysis, the results  gen- 
erated by the  automatic analysis appear to be  complete and  sound, i. e.,  including neither 
false  negatives nor false positives.  Obviously,  they  include  no results  that  could  not have 
been generated manually.  But this should  be seen as a positive,  rather  than a negative fea- 
ture.  After all, the objective  of this work is not producing  insights  beyond  the current  practice 
of engineers, but reducing  the work load in safety  analysis by automating mechanistic rea- 
soning steps in the analysis. The production of the tables shown in this report takes less than 
a second, whereas producing  them manually  will require  several person hours  of work. 
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6.1  Relationships between the Three  Perspectives 
	  
	  
From First to  Second Perspective   The  semi-formal  way of how hazards are  encoded 
in the  first perspective (Section  3.3) can  be  coupled  with the  way defective transitions are 
modeled in the second perspective (Section  4.3).  Hence, from the viewpoint of qualitative 
state machine modeling, the first and second perspectives are tightly related  and compatible. 
This is also  shown  in Table  3.3 which relates the first and  second perspective by means of 
the system interface, both models  refer to. 
	  
	  
	  
From Second to Third Perspective and Back  For an integration  of the second and third 
perspective, the driving situations in Table  5.2 can  be aligned  with the outputs  of the envi- 
ronment  state machine (Figure 4.3).  This state machine could be utilized to provide a more 
compact and  yet general scenario model.  The OK model  matches the glass-box version  of 
use , the fault models  match  the pendants of ffail . The atomic transitions in the state machine 
f∗   ∗  
based perspective (e.g.,  Figure 4.4b), particularly the defective transitions, i. e., parts  of the 
failure  model,  can  be  well investigated and  justified by the  FMEA procedure explained in 
Section  5.5.  Similarly, the third perspective can  be utilized to derive common  cause failures 
and  represent it in the system-level state machine fI  .  Beyond  the hazard and  impact  ana- 
lysis explained in Section  5, Section  4 provides  guidance for hazard treatment at a  state 
machine level.   Steps 3 and  4 in Section  4.2  match  the  reasoning step  from hazards  to 
impacts  explained in Section  5.6 and, particularly, Section  5.6.3. 
	  
	  
	  
6.2  Deriving Safety Requirements for Embedded Software 
	  
	  
In the  perspectives presented above, the  models  were  used for determining hazards and 
their impact  on the environment, i. e., for analysis only.  However,  regarding the perspective 
shown  in Figure 5.1, the model also forms the basis  for the derivation of safety  requirements 
and,  hence, could contribute  to re-design for safety.   Based on the formalism introduced in 
Sections 5.2–5.4, we illustrate  this potential  in an  abstract way:  First, in the analysis step, 
a particular  physical  scenario, SP , (say,  heavy  braking  on a slope)  is mapped to the  input 
channel of the  software  by the  physical  model,  RP S  (which  can  be  ROK  or some  RM Ai 
representing a faulty  component), as  a set  of sensor signals, or, rather,  ranges of sensor 
signals (e.g.,  pressure, wheel speeds, etc.), 
	  
	  
IS  = πI (RP S SP ), (6.1) 
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E 
SW 
SW E 
SW 
SW 
	  
	  
where  πI denotes the projection  to the input channels I of the embedded software. 
	  
The  software  model  RSW  needs to determine the  respective output  in terms  of actuator 
signals (e. g., to the valves  controlling the braking) 
	  
OS = πO (RSW IS ), (6.2) 
	  
	  
where  πO  is the projection  to the output channel. Based on the scenario SP   and  OS , which 
is the input to the physical  system, RP S determines the behavior  of the physical  system with 
respect to its environment: 
	  
	  
BE = πE (SP  RP S OS ), (6.3) 
	  
where  πE is the projection  to the interface  of the physical  system to the environment (e. g., 
too high deceleration), which may then lead to a relevant  impact on the environment. 
	  
On this basis, safety  requirements for the embedded software  may be determined by “back- 
propagating” a safety  requirement on the  behavior  of the  physical  system to the  software: 
avoiding the impact  by avoiding the hazard BE  establishes a revised  system response B t    , 
(e.g., the complement of BE or a subset of it). RP S infers a required  modified software  output 
in scenario SP 
	  
	  
S = πO (BE RP S SP ), (6.4)
 
Ot   t  
	  
i. e., the requirement on the modified software  model Rt  
	  
	  
πO (Rt   IS ) ⊂  πO (B t   RP S SP ), (6.5) 
	  
or describing the software  as a function F t   : I →  O with 
	  
	  
SW : πI (RP S SP ) →  πO (BE RP S SP ) (6.6)
 
F t   t  
	  
satisfies the requirement. 
	  
The state machine approach used in the second perspective (Section  4.3) always  refers  to 
a specific  system boundary. Now, this approach can  be applied  to software  as  follows:  In 
Section  4.3, we exemplified the state machine based on the boundary of the physical system 
(Figure 5.1). Having the derived  function F t   , we can enter  the procedure described for the 
second perspective, starting  with the derivation  of a nominal  state machine, etc.  However, 
still a  point  of future  work is how  to perform  Steps 3 and  4 in detail  solely  for software 
components using traditional software  FMEA or FTA approaches (Section  1.2). 
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We presented three  perspectives of safety  analysis substantially based on the results  of the 
project Efficient Hazard and Impact Analysis for Automotive Mechatronics Systems on behalf 
of ITK Engineering AG, Stuttgart-Vaihingen.  On  the  basis  of the  characteristics of these 
three  perspectives as  summarized in Sections 3.4, 4.4 and  5.8, we conclude our report  as 
follows: 
	  
The  first perspective leverages semi-formal  specification of hazards and  safety goals 
using reusable textual patterns and allows optimizing hazard tables and their content  by 
identifying logical relationships (e.g., refinement between hazards) among  and between 
these two classes of assertions. 
	  
The second perspective leverages state machines for hazard analysis and aims to ease 
the management of large  hazard tables as  well as  to allow for additional  analyses and 
the conduct  of subsequent safety  engineering tasks  (e.g.,  the constructive treatment of 
hazards). This behavior-oriented perspective is suited  to be applied  early in the safety 
life cycle. 
	  
The third perspective automatically performs  integrated hazard and impact analysis us- 
ing a  model  of the  system structure and  qualitative  models  of physical  and  software 
component behavior.  It also  considers the  system environment using  the  same mod- 
eling paradigm and  applies an automated FMEA algorithm for end-to-end cause-effect 
reasoning. 
	  
The  first two perspectives focused holistic aspects of systems, control  and  software  engi- 
neering  and leveraged the idea that speaking about  behavioral properties of the whole sys- 
tem,  one  can  postpone to distinguish  physical  signals and  components from the  software 
counterparts to later development phases.  We consider this as an advantage for early stage 
hazard and  impact  analysis and  for reusing  such  system models  independent of technical 
solutions. Nevertheless, the  consideration of the  system structure or physical  architecture 
design  including modularization into mechanical, electrical  and software  parts  as focused by 
the third perspective is mandatory to capture the fault space and to justify the more abstract 
reasoning results. Overall, qualitative  physical  modeling  plays an important  role in all of the 
three  perspectives, even  if formalized in a different fashion. Section  6.1 provides  some  more 
details  on the relationships of the three  perspectives. 
	  
In a first step  and  by means of a case study,  we approached the criteria for an appropriate 
hazard and impact analysis methodology as characterized by the project goals and criteria in 
Section  1.3.  As a point of future work, Section  6.2 formally sketches how to derive interface 
requirements for control software  from the requirements for the overall physical  system. 
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Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) after ISO Std. 26262,  a set of safety-specific re- 
quirements for an item, e. g., a system, a component, a software  module  or a process 
activity, depending on the hazard assessment result.  14 
	  
	  
behavioral property  a  property  of a  system observable at  the  system interface, i.e.,  its 
inputs/stimuli or outputs/reactions. 15, 65, used by requirement 
	  
	  
common cause failure  (CCF) several system failures caused by the same single or set  of 
faults. 59 
	  
component role of an entity being  part of a system, can  itself be considered as  a system. 
35, 36, 63–65 
	  
constraint (i) a mathematical relation  fulfilling some  property  or predicate, or (ii) just the 
property  or predicate itself. 26, 65 
	  
cyber-physical system  view of a system with a focus on the relationship between software 
components, computer networks  and  physical  components to ultimately provide  func- 
tionality to a user.  5, 15, 33, 34, in this report also synonym for system 
	  
	  
defect model   a  system model  capturing  structural  or behavioral deviations or discrepan- 
cies,  e.g.,  failures or faults, from the specified  ordinary system. 25, 64 
	  
driving situation gives information about  the driving mode  and velocity. 12, 35, 38, 44, 46, 
59, 63, 67, part of the environment condition 
	  
	  
ECU Electronic  or Embedded Control Unit. 11, 34, 42, 57 
	  
effect a result  of the  performance of a transition  or action,  this result  can  be  negative or 
unwanted, e.g.,  a failure or hazard, as in FMEA. 33, 45, 64, 65, see hazard 
	  
environment includes  the vehicle of our case study including surrounding physical  objects 
which can have  an impact on the vehicle and vice versa. 25, 33, 35, 63–65,  generalized 
by operational context 
	  
environment condition contains information about the driving situation, road condition, and 
spatial  configuration.  12, 35, 36, 40, 53, 65, 67, captured  by scenario 
	  
environment model   compact representation of the environment consisting of many scenar- 
ios. 44, see scenario 
	  
event describes a point in time in which the system or its environment happens to observe 
or do (i. e., change) something. 16, see state 
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failure  behavioral violation of specified  system functionality. 25, 26, 63–65 
	  
failure mode . see fault mode 
	  
failure model   the defect  model for the first (Section  3) and second perspective (Section  4). 
59, see defect  model 
	  
fault  potential root cause of a failure; also called weakness, error, bug or mistake. 5, 26, 33, 
43, 63 
	  
fault mode class of individual faults in the same location  or component of the model  used 
in the third perspective. 39, 40, see fault 
	  
fault model   the defect  model for the third perspective (Section  5). 38, 59, see defect  model 
	  
faulty behavior . 39, 41, see failure 
	  
FMEA failure mode and effects  analysis; also called failure mode, effects and criticality ana- 
lysis (FMECA), if the assessment of criticality in terms  of type and severity  of impacts  is 
tightly related  with the effects.  7, 63 
	  
	  
hazard  a combination of the current  state and  mode  of operation of both, the environment 
and  the system, e.g.,  a system failure or maloperation, directly or indirectly enabling  a 
safety risk and, thus, potentially its occurrence in terms of a mishap. 6, 9, 15, 19, 24–26, 
33, 34, 45, 63–65,  see risk 
	  
hazard and impact  analysis  equivalent to the activity of hazard  analysis  and risk assess- 
ment  (HARA) in ISO 26262  part 3. 8, 61 
	  
	  
impact  . 6, 12, 25, 28, 33, 35, 50, 51, 64, 65, in this report also synonym for mishap 
	  
	  
local  situation one  or more  states of the  environment and  the  system, e.g.,  initial states. 
25, 26, 29 
	  
	  
machine boundary . a synonym for system boundary 
	  
mishap potential consequence or effect of a hazard; synonymous to impact, harming event, 
accident, incident.  25, 64, 65, specializes risk 
	  
mode (of operation) represents a specific behavior  of a system within some time period of 
time and, hence, usually represents a set of states. 16, 37, 64, see state 
	  
	  
OK model   a model specifying  the structure and the ordinary qualitative  dynamics of a sys- 
tem.  59, see defect  model 
	  
Glossary 
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operation mathematical relation.  37, see constraint 
	  
operational context  a specific  part  of the  world capturing  the  environment of the  system 
under  consideration. 8, specialized by environment 
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requirement a structural  or behavioral property  required  to be fulfilled by the system to be 
built and operated or a component thereof;  usually the opposite of failure or hazard. 9, 
15, 63, specialized by safety  goal 
	  
risk  or safety risk:  an  effect,  e.g.,  an  impact  or mishap, occurring  at a probability of <  1 
given a known scenario or state. 25, 34, 36, 64, see mishap 
	  
road condition gives information about  the slope,  friction, and  curves. 35, 38, 44, 63, part 
of the environment condition 
	  
	  
safety analysis . 33, 65, see hazard and impact analysis 
	  
safety goal  a structural  or behavioral property  required  to be  fulfilled by the system to be 
built and  operated in order  to prevent  from the occurrence of hazards or their impacts. 
19, 24, 27, generalized by requirement 
	  
safety property  . 23, 30, 67, in this report also synonym for safety  goal 
	  
scenario a constraint capturing  relevant  initial states of the environment, e.g.,  environment 
conditions, system states. 36, 39, 50, 63, 65 
	  
spatial  configuration gives  information  about  location  of objects in the  environment. 35, 
50, 52, 63, 66, part of the environment condition 
	  
specification an  informal (natural  language, textual),  semi-formal  (controlled  textual  pat- 
terns)  or formal  (mathematically defined)  artifact,  e. g.,  a document, containing  a de- 
scription  or model  of the  considered system.  15,  25,  also  contains elements of type 
requirement 
	  
state   represents a valuation  of a set  of attributes of a system or component within some 
time period of time.  16, 64, 65, see event 
	  
system a technical  entity (i) consisting of interconnected components, (ii) exhibiting physical 
behavior  and  delivering a specified  functionality, (iii) the subject of safety  analysis. 15, 
25, 33, 63–65 
	  
system boundary the boundary between the system and its environment to define the sys- 
tem interface. 19, 22, 26, 60, 65, see system interface 
	  
system interface a  set  of shared phenomena such  as,   e. g.,  communication  channels, 
ports,  points of interaction, as  a syntactic  basis  or a vocabulary to specify the behavior 
of a system. 15, 22, 24, 25, 63, 65, see system boundary 
	  
	  
terminal  element of a  system model  which is needed to propagate effects  between two 
other  components, particularly used to propagate effects  across the system boundary. 
37, see system boundary 
67 
	  
	  
4.5 The usage function fI   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . /Move . . . 32 
4.6 The safety  fragment  fI   (a) and the overall function fI   (b) pBrake  StopBrake 	   . . 32 
	  
use.StopBrake fail.StopBrake 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
List of Figures 
	  
	  
	  
	  
1.1 Approaches to hazard analysis for system safety  assessment .  . . . . . . . . 6 
1.2 Overview and relationships between the three  perspectives  .  .  . . . . . . . . 9 
2.1 Physical  and control component structure for the truck drive train . . . . . . . 11 
	  
3.1 System Modes:  Hierarchy   .  .  .  .  .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
3.2 Mode transition  diagram   .  .  .  .  .  .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
3.3 System interface  (initial vocabulary) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
3.4    System interface  (vocabulary after a refinement)   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 22 
	  
4.1    A procedure in six steps for using the framework (adopted from [Gle13])  .  .  . 26 
4.2    Excerpt  of a truck usage function hierarchy    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 30 
4.3    Excerpt  of an environment tactics  hierarchy   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 31 
4.4    The usage function fI   (a) and possible defects fI   (b) .  .  . 32 
	  
use.Drive 
	  
save.Sto 
	  
5.1    The  vehicle  as  an  aggregation of physical  and  software  components in an 
environment .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 34 
5.2    Core elements of automated hazard and impact analysis .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 35 
5.3    A relational perspective on determining effects  based on fault modes and sce- 
narios  Sk  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 39 
5.4    Automatic generation of a specific FMEA analysis by automated model  com- 
position and application  of a generic inference engine.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 40 
5.5    Vehicle model (Screenshot from Raz’r [OCC95])  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 44 
5.6    Qualitative modeling:  location of nominal and deviating accelerations exempli- 
fied for one hazard and one driving situation  (ID 13 in Table 5.3)  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 45 
5.7    Location  of nominal  and  deviating  accelerations exemplified  for one  hazard 
and one driving situation  (ID 13 in Table 5.3) in the qualitative time domain  .  . 46 
5.8    Hazard  analysis for the driving situation  ”F-start”   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 47 
5.9    Hazard  analysis for the driving situation  ”F-brake” .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 48 
5.10  Hazard  analysis for the driving situation  ”Drive” .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 49 
5.11  Rectifying the road   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 51 
5.12  The qualitative spatial  representation .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 51 
5.13  Overview of spatial  configurations .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 52 
5.14  The  spatial  reasoning components.  For each reasoning step,  only one  ele- 
ment from the right, which represents a spatial  configuration,  is connected to 
form a specific spatial  configuration  as part of a scenario.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 52 

List of Tables 
67 
	  
	  
2.1 List of hazards  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . . . . 12 
2.2 List of relevant  driving situations as a part of the environment conditions . . . 12 
	  2.3 Results of manual hazard analysis  .  .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
2.4 Results of manual impact analysis  .  .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
3.1 Explanation of the vehicle mode  names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
List of Tables 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
3.2 
	  
3.3 
Relationships between the hazards semi-formalized based  on Table  2.3 and 
corresponding safety  properties    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Interface  ports:  Vocabulary  bridging the gap  to the second perspective (Sec- 
tion 4)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
	  
	  
23 
	  
23 
4.1 Use case #27 “Use truck”  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 28 
4.2 Use case #5 “Park at steep hill” .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 28 
4.3 Use case #10 “Use brakes”  always  included  by UC#5  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 29 
4.4 Hazard  assessment  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 29 
5.1 Retarder stuck engaged - Deviation constraint .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 42 
5.2 Definition of driving situations  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 45 
5.3 Definition of hazards, multiple values in a cell indicate  a disjunction,  extends 
and refines  Table 2.1  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
	  
47 
5.4 Impact analysis 1, results  from hazards to impacts    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 54 
5.5 Results of the impact analysis for the “freeway exit ahead” environment conditio n 55 
68 
Glossary 	  
	  
	  
69 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Bibliography 
	  
	  
	  
[BC95] J. Buys and  J. Clark.  Events and  Causal Factors (ECF) Analysis.   Technical  Re- 
search and Analysis Center, SCIENTECH Inc., 1995. 
	  
[BK08] Christel Baier and Joost-Pieter Katoen.  Principles of Model Checking. MIT Press, 
5 2008. 
	  
[Bro05] Manfred Broy. Service-oriented Systems Engineering: Specification and Design of 
Services and Layered  Architectures – The JA N U S  Approach.  In Manfred Broy, ed- 
itor, Engineering Theories of Software Intensive Systems, pages 47–81.  Springer, 
2005. 
	  
[Bro10] Manfred Broy. A logical basis  for component-oriented software  and systems engi- 
neering. The Computer Journal, 53(10):1758–82, 2010. 
	  
[Bro12] Manfred Broy. Functional  safety based on a system reference model.  In Australian 
System Safety Conference, Brisbane, QLD, Australia, May 2012. 
	  
[BS01]  M. Broy and  K. Stølen.   Specification and  Development of Interactive  Systems: 
Focus  on Streams, Interfaces, and Refinement. Springer, 2001. 
	  
[Cam10]   A. Campetelli. Analysis techniques: State of the art in industry and research. Tech. 
rep., TU München, 2010. 
	  
[Coc00]  Alistair Cockburn. Writing Effective Use Cases. Crystal Series for Software  Devel- 
opment. Addison-Wesley Longman, Amsterdam, Oct 2000. 
[Cod70]    E.F. Codd.  A relational  model of data  for large shared data  banks. CACM, 1970. 
[DBB92]  J.B. Dugan,  S.J.  Bavuso, and  M.A. Boyd.   Dynamic  fault-tree  models  for fault- 
tolerant  computer systems. IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 41(3):363–77, 1992. 
	  
[Fle08]  A. Fleischmann.  Model-based formalization  of requirements of embedded auto- 
motive  systens. PhD thesis, TU München, 2008. 
	  
[Gle13] Mario Gleirscher. Hazard  analysis for technical  systems. In 2nd Research Track at 
5th Software Quality Days,  number 133 in Lecture  Notes  on Business Information 
Processing (LNBIP), page 104ff, Vienna, January 2013.  Springer. 
	  
[Gra] Mentor  Graphics. Electrical   &  wire  harness  design. online.  http://www. 
mentor.com/products/electrical-design-software/capital/additional-automation/ 
electrical-analysis, accessed: Apr 2013. 
	  
[HdKC92] W. Hamscher, J. de Kleer, and  L. Console, editors.  Readings in Modelbased Di- 
agnosis: Diagnosis  of Designed Artifacts Based on Descriptions of their Structure 
and Function.  Morgan Kaufmann, 1992. 
Glossary 
70 
	  
	  
Bibliography 
	  
	  
[HM03] David Harel and  Rami Marelly.  Come, Let’s Play: Scenario-Based Programming 
Using LSCs  and the Play-Engine. Springer, 1st edition, Aug 2003. 
	  
[HT03] D. Harel and P. S. Thiagarajan. Message Sequence Charts. In L. Lavagno, G. Mar- 
tin, and B. Selic, editors,  UML for Real: Design  of Embedded Real-Time Systems, 
pages 77–105. Kluwer Academic  Publishers, 2003. 
	  
[ITK12] ITK Engineering AG. Internal project documentation on safety  analysis of a com- 
mercial road vehicle,  May 2012.  in German, provided  data  contains FMEA tables 
including hazard lists and system structure diagrams. 
	  
[JBS+ 11]  Stig Ole Johnsen, Cato Bjørkli, Trygve Steiro, Høakon  Fartum,  Hanne Haukenes, 
Jasmine Ramberg, and  Jan Skriver.   CRIOP:  A scenario method  for Crisis Inter- 
vention and Operability analysis. Technical Report A4312, SINTEF, Trondheim, 
Norway, 3 2011. 
	  
[Lev12] Nancy  Gail Leveson.   Engineering a Safer  World:  Systems Thinking  Applied  to 
Safety. Engineering Systems. MIT Press, 1 2012. 
	  
[NPW02]  T. Nipkow, L. C. Paulson, and  M. Wenzel.   Isabelle/HOL  – A Proof Assistant for 
Higher-Order Logic, volume 2283 of LNCS.  Springer, 2002. 
	  
[OCC95]  OCC’M Software  GmbH.   Raz’r  Model.   online,  1995.    http://www.occm.de, ac- 
cessed: Apr 2013. 
	  
[PCB+ 04]  C. Picardi, L. Console, F. Berger,  J. Breeman, T. Kanakis,  J. Moelands, S. Collas, 
E. Arbaretier,  N. De Domenico, E. Girardelli, O. Dressler, P. Struss, and  B. Zilber- 
mann.   AUTAS: a tool for supporting FMECA generation in aeronautic systems. 
In 16th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 750–754, Valencia, 
Spain,  August 2004. 
	  
[Pri00]     C. Price.   Autosteve: automated electrical  design  analysis.  In Proc. ECAI-2000, 
pages 721–725, 2000. 
	  
[Rit08] Sabine Rittmann.  A methodology for modeling  usage behavior  of multi-functional 
systems.  Dissertation, Technische Universität  München, München, 2008. 
	  
[SC12]  M. Spichkova and  A. Campetelli.  From software  to cyber-physical domain.   In In 
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Formal Techniques for Safety- 
Critical Systems (to appear),  2012. 
	  
[SF11]  Peter Struss and  Alessandro Fraracci.  FMEA of a Braking System – A Kingdom 
for a Qualitative  Valve Model.   In 25th  Intl. Workshop on Qualitative  Reasoning, 
Barcelona, Spain,  2011. 
	  
[SF12a]    Peter Struss and Alessandro Fraracci. Automated Model-based FMEA of a Braking 
System.  In 8th IFAC Symposium on Fault Detection, Supervision and  Safety of 
Technical  Processes, pages 373–378, Mexico City, Mexico, August 2012. 
	  
[SF12b]    Peter Struss and  Alessandro Fraracci. Modeling Hydraulic and  Software  Compo- 
nents for Automated FMEA of a Braking System. In Dearden,  R. and Snooke, N. 
(eds.),  23rd Workshop on the Principles of Diagnosis, Great  Malvern, UK, 2012. 
71 
	  
	  
Bibliography 
	  
	  
[SHT12]   M. Spichkova, F. Hölzl, and D. Trachtenherz. Verified System Development with the 
AutoFocus Tool Chain.  In 2nd Workshop on Formal Methods in the Development 
of Software (WS-FMDS), 2012. 
	  
[SP03]  Peter Struss and  C. Price.   Model-based systems in the  automotive industry.   AI 
Magazine, pages 17–34,  2003. 
	  
[Spi07] M. Spichkova.  Specification and  Seamless Verification of Embedded Real-Time 
Systems: FOCUS  on Isabelle.  PhD thesis, TU München, 2007. 
	  
[Spi10] M. Spichkova. From  Semiformal   Requirements To  Formal  Specifications   via 
MSCs.  Technical  Report  TUM-I1019, TU München, 2010. 
	  
[SR02]  I. Svedung and J. Rasmussen. Graphic representation of accident scenarios: Map- 
ping system structure and the causation of accidents. Safety Science, 40:397–417, 
2002. 
	  
[Str97]  Peter Struss.  Model-based and  qualitative  reasoning: An introduction.   Annals  of 
Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 19(III-IV):355–81, 1997.  Elsevier. 
	  
[Str00]  Peter Struss.  Modellbasierte Systeme und  Qualitative  Modellierung.   Handbuch 
der Künstlichen Intelligenz,  2000. 
	  
[Str04]  Peter Struss.  Models  of behavior  deviations in model-based systems.   In Pro- 
ceeding of the 16th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence  (ECAI), pages 
883–7,  Valencia,  Spain,  August 22-27 2004. 
	  
[Str06]  Jonathan Streit. SALT — Structured Assertion Language for Temporal  Logic. Tech- 
nische Universität  München, version  1.0.1 edition, Apr 2006. 
	  
[Str08]  Peter  Struss. Handbook of  Knowledge Representation,  chapter  Model-based 
Problem  Solving, pages 395–465. Elsevier,  2008. 
	  
[WDFN07] D. Wolter, F. Dylla, L. Frommberger, and B. Nebel.  Qualitative  spatial reasoning 
for rule compliant  agent navigation.  Journal of Artificial Intelligence, 2007. 
